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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1970s, China has undertaken a process of opening up to
the world and engaging in economic reform. I This process has brought
increased opportunities for Western nations to cooperate with China. 2
Predictably, efforts to cooperate also have given rise to new challenges, as
Chinese and Western cultures 3 and systems often conflict.
t Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2008; Yale University, B.A. 2005. 1 am deeply indebted
to Professor Paul Gewirtz for his constant support and guidance; to Tom Kellogg of the Yale China Law
Center, who provided countless suggestions for improving this Note; to Margaret Lewis of N.Y.U 's
US.-Asia Law Institute for her detailed feedback on an earlier draft; and to Jeff Sandberg and the Yale
Journal of International Law staff for their excellent editing.
I. CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES & INST. FOR INT'L ECON., CHINA: THE BALANCE
SHEET 17 (2006); Zheng Bijian, China's "Peaceful Rise " to Great-Power Status, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-
Oct 2005, at 18.
2. See Guiguo Wang, Economic Integration in Quest of Law: The Chinese Experience, J.
WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1995, at 5; Hanqin Xue, China's Open Policy and International Law, 4 CHINESE J.
INT'L L. 133 (2005) (describing how China began participating in international law after opening up its
economy).
3. The scope of the "Western world" is admittedly subjective. For the purposes of this Note,
the "West" is defined as the countries of Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand.
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Extradition, which is an important component of transnational criminal
law enforcement,4 presents one area in which cooperation with the Chinese
was not previously available, 5 but now can provide important benefits. The
United States and its allies are dedicated to combating international terrorism,
and they are negotiating mutual legal assistance and extradition treaties "at an
increasingly vigorous pace" in order to facilitate the return of suspected
terrorists for prosecution. 6 Further, a nation that cooperates in criminal law
enforcement can gain favor in China, which can translate into enhanced
7business ties in the rapidly developing Chinese economy. The Chinese are
also keenly interested in cooperating on extradition matters in order to
eliminate safe havens and bring to justice high-level corrupt officials who
have fled with significant capital (and who have overwhelmingly sought
refuge in developed Western nations). 8 In early 2007, China officially called
upon Western nations to sign extradition treaties with it. 9 Based on their
mutual interest in cooperation, one might expect Sino-Western extradition
treaty negotiations to proceed effortlessly.
For the West, however, human rights concerns present a significant
drawback to increased cooperation on extradition to China. Over the last
several decades, the human rights movement has "turned its attention to
extradition" to secure the rights of the individual sent to the requesting
country, and "[t]reaties, executive acts and judicial decisions on extradition
have all been affected."' 0 Extraditions to China are particularly controversial
because of the country's human rights practices. China uses the death penalty
4. "International criminal law enforcement in the practice of States relies on six modalities of
inter-State cooperation in criminal matters. These modalities are: extradition, legal assistance, transfer of
sentenced persons, transfer of penal proceedings, seizure and forfeiture of illicit proceeds of crime, and
recognition of foreign penal judgments." M. Cherif Bassiouni, Foreword to TREATY ENFORCEMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS, at vii (Rodrigo Yepes-Enriquez & Lisa Tabassi
eds., 2002).
5. Up until the early 1990s, China did not have extradition treaties with other states. Fu
Hualing, One Country and Two Systems: Will Hong Kong and the Mainland Reach an Agreement on
Rendition?, H.K. LAWYER, Jan. 1999, available at http://www.hk-lawyer.com/1999-1/Default.htm.
6. Jonathan M. Winer, Cops Across Borders. The Evolution of Transatlantic Law
Enforcement and Judicial Cooperation, in TRANSATLANTIC HOMELAND SECURITY: PROTECTING
SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF CATASTROPHIC TERRORISM 106, 106 (Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen & Daniel S.
Hamilton eds., 2006). Mutual legal assistance provides for the sharing of information and evidence
related to criminal investigations and prosecutions, whereas extradition is the process by which one
nation requests and obtains from another nation the surrender of a suspected or convicted criminal.
7. Monte Stewart, Feds Look for Balance in Trade with China, Bus. EDGE (Calgary, Alta.),
Apr. 20, 2007, http://www.businessedge.ca/article.cfin/newsID/l5173.cfm.
8. The fight against corruption is being carried out in the highest reaches of the central
government. Feng Jianhua, Clean Sweep: Employing Tougher Measures and Seeking International
Cooperation, China Aims to Leave Little Space for Corruption, BEIJING REV., Jan. 23, 2007, available at
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/nation/txt/2007-01/23/content_.53450.htm. There is still a long way to go in
the battle against corruption in China. In part because of a lack of international cooperation, many
fugitive corrupt officials remain out of China's reach. Chasing Escaped Corrupt Officials Remains
Arduous Task, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 4, 2003, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-
1 1/04/content_278159.htm; Raymond Zhou, Capital Flight: Capture of Corrupt Officials a Long Drive,
CHINA DAILY, Aug. 8, 2003, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-
08/12/content_254169.htm.
9. David Lague, China Urges Western Nations to Enter Extradition Treaties, N.Y. TIMES,
May 28, 2007, at A3.
10. John Dugard & Christine Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights,
92 AM.J. INT'L L. 187, 187 (1998).
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frequently, including as punishment for nonviolent crimes.,1 It also is severely
criticized for its poor record on torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment; prison sentences and conditions; harsh interrogation
methods; discrimination based on ethnicity, gender, and disability; the right to
a fair trial; and the right to privacy.
1 2
Despite these concerns, in 2005 China and Spain agreed on a
groundbreaking extradition treaty-the first such treaty China concluded with
a developed nation.1 3 As reported in the media, the treaty indicates China's
agreement "to respect in law the principle of no extradition of criminal
suspects who would face death penalty upon repatriation," 14 a policy that
enables foreign countries to make "conditional extraditions" to China. I5
France and Portugal subsequently signed and ratified similar treaties,' 6 and in
September 2007, Australia became the fourth Western nation to sign such a
treaty with Beijing. 17 Human rights organizations have criticized these
11. In China, the death penalty can be applied to sixty-eight offenses, including economic and
nonviolent crimes like smuggling, counterfeiting currency, embezzlement, and bribery. Cliff Ip, Si-si
Liu & Bonny Ling, China's Death Penalty Reforms, CHINA RTS. F., June 30, 2007, at 26, 26. While the
exact number of executions in China is a state secret, David Whedbee, Comment, The Faint Shadow of
the Sixth Amendment: Substantial Imbalance in Evidence-Gathering Capacity Abroad Under the U.S.-
P.R.C. Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement in Criminal Matters, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 561, 589
n.214 (2003), China is widely reported to execute more individuals than the rest of the world combined.
Amnesty Int'l, Executed "According to Law"? The Death Penalty in China,
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/chn-220304-feature-eng (last visited Nov. 7, 2007). China's frequent use
of the death penalty is anathema to Western Europe, Canada, and Australia. See EU Lawmakers Hold
Minute Silence for Death Penalty Victims, EUBuSrNESS, Oct. 10, 2007,
http://www.eubusiness.com/news-live/1 192029421.78/; Amnesty Int'l, The Death Penalty in Canada:
Twenty Years of Abolition (2000), http://www.amnesty.ca/deathpenalty/canada.php; Australian Gov't
Dep't of Foreign Affairs & Trade, Australia-China Human Rights Dialogue,
http://www.dfat.gov.au/hr/achrd/aus-proc-dialogue.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2007). The United States,
while unable to morally criticize the fact that China has the death penalty, joins its Western allies in
condemning the use of the death penalty for economic crimes, the procedural deficiencies in sentencing
an individual to death, and the inhumane conditions reported on death row. See, e.g., David Lague,
China Pressured on Death Penalty, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 15, 2005,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/14/news/china.php.
12. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2006: CHINA
(2007), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78771.htm; Harold Hongju Koh, A United
States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST. LOUiS U. L.J. 293, 317-18 (2002).
13. Sun Shangwu, China Signs Extradition Deal with Spain, CHINA DAILY, May 1, 2006,
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-05/0 /content_581658.htm.
14. China Ratifies Extradition Treaty with Spain, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Apr. 29, 2006,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-04/29/content_4491739_3.htm. See also Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo he xibanya wangguo yindu tiaoyue [China-Spain Extradition Treaty], Nov. 14, 2005, P.R.C.-
Spain, available at http://www.npc.cn/zgrdw/common/zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=350141&pdmc=rdgb
(text of the treaty in Chinese from the National People's Congress website) (last visited Dec. 4, 2007)
[hereinafter China-Spain Extradition Treaty].
15. A requested state can place conditions on how an extradited individual will be treated after
returning to the requesting state. This approach is called "conditional extradition." It is often
controversial, but it "has not proved to be an impenetrable barrier to compromise." Thomas Rose, Note,
A Delicate Balance: Extradition, Sovereignty, and Individual Rights in the United States and Canada,
27 YALE J. INT'L L. 193, 214-15 (2002).
16. France Signs Extradition Treaty with China, FRANCE24.COM, Mar. 20, 2007,
http://www.france24.com/france24Public/en/archives/news/2007/March/europe/20070320-china-
extradition.html.
17. Press Release, Philip Ruddock, Att'y Gen. of Austl., Australia-China International Crime
Cooperation Strengthened (Sept. 6, 2007), http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/WWW/ministerruddockhome.nsf/
Page/RWPB8B9776D4A85534ECA25734E0021CF6D. China and Australia already had in place a
treaty on judicial cooperation. China Ratifies Treaty on Judicial Cooperation with Australia, PEOPLE'S
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agreements for their supposed blindness to the totality of the human rights
violations that occur in China, ' 8 even though the signing of international
agreements that restrict China's use of the death penalty is a positive human
rights development. However, there may be another, broader human rights
benefit to the "treaty-based approach' ' 19 to extradition with China: these new
treaties, and the prospect of concluding extradition treaties with other
countries, appear to have accelerated a debate within China about whether to
cease executions for economic crimes in order to bring more corrupt fugitives
to justice. 20 Extradition negotiations have the potential to play an important
role in the broad push to curb certain human rights abuses in China. They
could give other nations a platform to request human rights reforms related
not only to the death penalty, but also to torture, modes of interrogation,
prison conditions, trial procedures, and other practices currently used by
China.
Yet, because of these human rights concerns, Canada has resisted
entering into an extradition treaty with China. Canada does have a mutual
legal assistance treaty with China for cooperation in the exchange of
evidence. 2 However, in terms of its willingness to extradite to China, Canada
appears to occupq the opposite end of the spectrum from the nations that have
entered treaties. It employs a strategy of non-engagement. The Canadian
Extradition Act does permit extradition to occur without a treaty through ad
DAILY, Nov. 1, 2006, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200611/01/
eng20061101317106.html.
18. Shar Adams, Australia 's Extradition Treaty with China Criticised, EPOCH TIMES, Sept. 18,
2007, available at htps://w,..theepochtimes.co./ncws/7-9-18/9099.html (criticizing the Australian
treaty because the Chinese legal system is "woefully inadequate"); China and Spain Boost Trade Ties,
BBC NEWS, Nov. 14, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4432694.stm (noting criticisms of the
Spanish treaty by Amnesty International Spain because "China is one of the world's most frequent
violator [sic] of human rights"); France Signs Extradition Treaty with China, supra note 16 (noting that
Amnesty International France has criticized the French treaty because of "continuing reports of serious
violations in China").
19. This Note will refer to the approaches of the nations that have signed extradition treaties
with China-Spain, France, Portugal, and Australia-as the "treaty-based approach."
20. See Lague, supra note 11 ("The Chinese government is under pressure to scrap the death
penalty for nonviolent crimes so that corrupt officials fleeing abroad can be more easily extradited.
Chinese legal scholars have called on the government to modify the law so that foreign courts can be
confident that fugitives returned to China will not face execution .... "); Liu Li, Experts Callfor Review
of Sentencing, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 13, 2005, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
english/doc/2005-08/13/content_468682.htm ("Law experts have called for the death penalty to be
dropped as punishment for non-violent crimes to ease the extradition of some 4,000 suspected corrupt
officials who have fled abroad."); Zhang Zhiping, Should the Death Penalty Be Abolished for
Corruption?, BEIJING REv., Dec. 18, 2006, available at http://www.bjreview.com.cn/forum/txt/2006-
12/18/content 51253.htm; see also infra notes 136-143.
21. Treaty Between The Government of Canada and the People's Republic of China on
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Can.-P.R.C., July 29, 1994, 1995 Can. T.S. No. 29; see
also Vincent C. Yang, Dir., China Program, Int'l Ctr. for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice
Policy, Conference Paper at the International Symposium on the Prevention and Control of Financial
Fraud, Cooperation in Combating Fraud: Beyond the Treaties and Conventions (Oct. 19-22, 1998) 4-7,
available at http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/yang-pap.pdf (describing the Canada-
China mutual legal assistance treaty).
22. See Geoffrey York, Five Fugitives Hiding in Canada, China Says, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Feb. 3, 2007, at A22.
2008] United States's Response to Extradition Requests from China 181
hoc agreements on a case-by-case basis, 23 as does the Extradition Law of the
People's Republic of China, 24 but it has proven extremely difficult for China
to gain aproval from Canada for extraditions because of human rights
concerns. 5
Like Canada, the U.S. government also appears to be resisting
negotiation of a formal extradition treaty with China. 6 Nevertheless, despite
the fact that ad hoc negotiations between the United States and China for the
return of criminal suspects absent a treaty are time-consuming and rarely
successful, the United States has still arranged for the return of more criminal
suspects to China than Canada has done. U.S. law limits the scenarios in
which extraditions can occur in the absence of a treaty,27 but when extradition
is not available, some criminal suspects may be returned through diplomatic
negotiations for deportation under U.S. immigration law (a tactic that is also
utilized by other countries and is sometimes referred to as "disguised
extradition"). 28 The contemporary U.S. approach to returning criminal
suspects to China occupies a middle ground between the treaty-based
approach and the non-engagement approach.
In light of the potentially positive human rights impact of the treaty-
based approach to extradition with China, this Note considers whether the ad
hoc, case-by-case approach to extradition with China remains a sound strategy
for the United States. This question is highly relevant today given the
disproportionately large number of Chinese officials who have fled to the
United States, 29 and given that several cases are pending in U.S. courts
23. Extradition Act, 1999 S.C. ch. 18, § 10(1) (Can.) ("The Minister of Foreign Affairs may,
with the agreement of the Minister, enter into a specific agreement with a State or entity for the purpose
of giving effect to a request for extradition in a particular case.").
24. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yindu fa [Extradition Law of the People's Republic of
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong, Dec. 28, 2000, effective Dec. 28,
2000), art. 15, available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law-view.asp?id=508 (Chinese text of law), and
at http://english.gov.cn/laws/2005-09/22/content_68710.htm (English translation) ("Where there is no
extradition treaty to go by, the Requesting State shall make a reciprocity assurance.") [hereinafter
Extradition Law].
25. See, e.g., Shao Da, No Early Resolution in Lai Extradition Case, CHINA.ORG.CN, Sept. 27,
2004, http://www.china.org.cn/english/2004/Sep/108155.htm (describing problems and delays in Sino-
Canadian individual extradition negotiations); Geoffrey York, China Asks Canada to Deport Alleged
Embezzler, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Jan. 29, 2007, at A I ("Suspects can still be extradited to China
without a treaty, but it is a more complicated and difficult process.").
26. PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, AGREEMENT WITH HONG KONG FOR THE SURRENDER
OF FUGITIVE OFFENDERS, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-3, at iii (1997) (noting the absence of an extradition
treaty between the United States and the People's Republic of China); Daniel M. Creekman, Note, A
Helpless America? An Examination of the Legal Options Available to the United States in Response to
Varying Types of Cyber-Attacks from China, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 641, 658 (2002); Enk Alexander
Rapoport, Comment, Extradition and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: Will Hong Kong
Remain a Separate and Independent Jurisdiction After 1997?, 4 ASIAN L.J. 135, 150 (1997); James D.
Wilets, Case Commentary, Lui v. United States, 110 F.3d 103 (Ist Cir 1997), 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 537,
541 (1997).
27. U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-15.100 (1997) (limiting
U.S. extraditions without a treaty to instances when the requested individual committed a crime of
violence against nationals of the United States in a foreign country).
28. For background information on disguised extradition, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 121-45 (1974).
29. Zhang Zhiping, supra note 20.
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concerning allegedly corrupt Chinese nationals whom China would like the
United States to extradite.
30
Part II of this Note introduces the literature on the nexus of extradition
law and human rights law. Part III elaborates on the polar approaches to offer
points of comparison before describing the U.S. approach of negotiating to
return criminal suspects to China on a case-by-case basis. An analysis of the
benefits and drawbacks of these three divergent approaches follows in Part IV.
The analysis reveals that there are important policy benefits to the case-by-
case approach to extradition. Benefits include the flexibility to pursue
conditions not in a treaty and the ability to place greater pressure on China to
pursue long-term human rights reforms. Part IV concludes by arguing that the
United States should maintain the case-by-case approach. However, Part V
argues that the United States should improve on its approach as currently
administered. It should better protect the rights of potential extraditees, direct
its efforts around influencing the Chinese human rights debate, and increase
its cooperation with China outside the extradition-human rights dialogue.
II. THE INTERSECTION OF EXTRADITION LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Extradition law, which involves sovereign powers surrendering
individuals accused or convicted of an offense outside their territory to a state
requesting to prosecute for the offense, is an important mechanism for
suppressing crime by preventing criminals from finding safe havens. 31 It is "a
blend of international and national law." 32 In the international law arena,
treaties typically provide for the transfer of criminal fugitives between states.
Bilateral extradition treaties are by far the most common type of agreement.
33
34In 1990, the United Nations released a model extradition treaty, providing a
framework to assist its member states with negotiating bilateral extradition
agreements. Bilateral treaties dominate extradition practice because they
increase certainty and accountability in international crime control.
Multilateral extradition conventions also exist. 36 Further, some international
conventions, which are not extradition conventions as such, nevertheless
30. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Bank of China Managers and Their
Wives Indicted for Stealing More than $485 Million, Laundering Money Through Las Vegas Casinos
(Jan. 31, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nv/home/pressrelease/january2006/chaofanO13106.htm.
31. Ved P. Nanda, Bases for Refusing International Extradition Requests: Capital Punishment
and Torture, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1369, 1369 (2000).
32. Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, supra note 10, at 188.
33. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE 24 (5th ed. 2007); Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 250 (1995).
34. Model Treaty on Extradition, G.A. Res. 45/116, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Dec. 14, 1990),
amended by G.A. Res. 52/88, arts. 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/52/49 (Dec. 12, 1997).
35. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 664 (1992) ("[E]xtradition treaties
exist so as to impose mutual obligations to surrender individuals in certain defined sets of circumstances,
following established procedures.").
36. Multilateral extradition treaties include the European Convention on Extradition, the
Commonwealth Scheme for the Rendition of Fugitive Offenders, the Arab League Extradition
Convention, the Interamerican Extradition Convention, and the Economic Community of West African
States Extradition Convention. Interpol, Extradition: Some Benchmarks (Mar. 18, 2003),
http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/FactSheets/FS 1I asp.
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incorporate provisions relating to extradition law. 37 Additionally, a "disguised
extradition"-the process of employing legal procedures other than
extradition to transfer a fugitive from one state into the hands of another
state's authorities-can occur without a treaty, through diplomatic
negotiations and deportation, if permissible under both states' laws. 38
"Because entering into an extradition treaty," or a disguised extradition
agreement, "involves the sacrifice of some sovereign rights, these agreements
are always reciprocal. 39
Typically, a formal request for extradition is made through diplomatic
channels accompanied by an arrest warrant, information about the identity of
the accused, and the basic facts of the offense,4 ° and then the municipal law of
the requested state must determine whether the seizure and transfer of the
fugitive would accord with the agreement. 41 The content of national
extradition laws varies, and such laws may take a purely administrative or
purely judicial approach to this question, but most frequently they involve a
42combination of both judicial and administrative functions. Under this quasi-
executive and quasi-judicial approach, a refusal on the part of the judicial
authorities to grant extradition is binding on the administrative authorities. If
the judicial authorities give their consent to extradition after a review of prima
facie evidence from the requesting state, the executive authorities may-in
addition to taking into account purely legal considerations-examine
questions related to reciprocity and the desirability of the extradition.43
A. History of Individual Rights in Extradition
Extradition has its roots in the idea of territorial jurisdiction.
Historically, extradition was reserved for political or religious offenders who
threatened the king, emperor, or religious hierarchy. The process of
extradition derived from an international principle of comity among states.
Each ruler would "respect the authority" of another government and return a
37. Id. For instance, in terms of human rights, Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) stipulates that each state is responsible for respecting and ensuring
the civil and political rights of persons within its jurisdiction and territory, a clause that may affect
extraditions. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, art. 2(1), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. AIRES/2200 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar.
23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
38. This avenue, which is not really extradition at all, is important in the American approach
to responding to extradition requests. See Terry Richard Kane, Prosecuting International Terrorists in
United States Courts: Gaining the Jurisdictional Threshold, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 294, 333 (1987); U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 27, §§ 9-15.100, 9-15.610 (requiring an offer of reciprocity when
extradition is granted without a treaty); McNabb Assocs., Extradition from China to the United States-
Danlei Chen, International Extradition Blog, http://www.intemationalextraditionblog.com/
2006_06_I _archive.html (June 16, 2006, 09:35 EST) (describing how the mutual legal assistance
treaty with China provides for extradition in the absence of an extradition treaty); infra Section III.C.
39. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Comment, Standing to Allege Violations of the Doctrine of
Specialty: An Examination of the Relationship Between the Individual and the Sovereign, 62 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1187, 1187 (1995).
40. ANTHONY I. AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 265 (2005).
41. Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, supra note 10, at 188.
42. Interpol, supra note 36.
43. MITSUE INAZUMI, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW: EXPANSION
OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION FOR PROSECUTING SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 228
(2005).
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suspect who was a subject of that government "no questions asked," so the
rights of the individual were not protected.'
The idea of applying extradition to suppress criminality developed in the
mid-nineteenth century. Since then, bilateral extradition treaties have
traditionally included at least three clauses that safeguard individual rights.
First, the political offense exception enables a state receiving an extradition
request (the "requested state") to refuse to extradite a person who had been
involved in politicalli motivated crimes in the state seeking an extradition (the
"requesting state"). The political offense exception intersects with the
political asylum doctrine, as once asylum is granted, it is well established that
a request for extradition must be denied if related to the commission of
political offenses.46 Second, the rule of double criminality holds that a person
may not be extradited unless the action that the person allegedly committed
was illegal under the laws of both the requesting state and the requested
state.47 Finally, the principle of specialty guarantees that the extraditee will be
tried only for the crime for which she was extradited.48
These clauses provide some security for the rights of the individual, but
they fall short of satisfying the modem concept of human rights protections.49
The political offense exception excuses the requested state from having to
consider human rights violations arising from a political dispute in the
requesting state.5° The double criminality requirement and the principle of
specialty do not protect human rights but only "ensure that foreign states will
not be allowed to punish fugitives for conduct considered contrary to the
requested state's own--often chauvinistic-notions of criminal justice.'
Requested states may waive the specialty rule, demonstrating that it is not
meant to protect the fugitive. 52 The extradited individual lacks standing to
44. MICHAEL FOONER, INTERPOL: ISSUES IN WORLD CRIME AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 144 (1989).
45. "The Political Offense Exception [which originated to enable grants of political asylum] is
an exception to a general treaty obligation to extradite to a requesting country." IVOR STANBROOK &
CLIVE STANBROOK, EXTRADITION: LAW AND PRACTICE 65 & n. 1 (2d ed. 2000). This exception has
attracted much attention and controversy, ETHAN A. NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS: THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S. CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 419 (1993), but it is generally observed
by states. STANBROOK & STANBROOK, supra, at 65. However, with the rise of international terrorism,
some bilateral treaties have begun to exclude it. See, e.g., Supplementary Treaty, U.S.-U.K., June 25,
1985, T I.A.S. No. 12050.
46. CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY: RULES FOR
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 66 (2005).
47. STANBROOK & STANBROOK, supra note 45, at 20. The validity of the double criminality
rule has never faced serious contention, "resting as it does in part on the basic principle of reciprocity
which underlies the whole structure of extradition, and in part on the maxim nulla poena sine lege." I.A.
SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 137-38 (1971); see also GEOFF GILBERT, ASPECTS OF
EXTRADITION LAw 47 (1991) (explicating the uncontroversial nature of the rule of double cnminality).
48. The specialty rule is a feature of all extradition agreements. "It appears to be universally
recognized and therefore merits the status of a general principle of international law." STANBROOK &
STANBROOK, supra note 45, at 47.
49. Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, supra note 10, at 188 ("[lit would be incorrect to explain




52. BASSIOUNI, supra note 33, at 585-86.
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challenge the violation of an extradition treaty. 3 Furthermore, courts in many
jurisdictions have subscribed to a rule of non-inquiry, meaning that they
refuse to inquire into the criminal justice standards in the requesting state "on
the grounds that it is a matter best left to executive determination, 4 although
this rule is no longer absolute.5 5 In light of these deficiencies, it was inevitable
that the modem human rights movement would influence extradition policies.
B. The Modern Human Rights Movement and Extradition
The modem human rights movement was born after the creation of the
United Nations and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights; 56 human rights became an explicit concern of extradition law soon
thereafter. Some nations were affected by feelings of guilt for their refusal to
accommodate refugees fleeing from Nazi and Soviet terror, and they
responded by "emphasizing traditions of asylum and hospitality to the
oppressed."5 In the half century following the Second World War, extradition
law became increasingly intertwined with human rights law.58 Important
developments for extradition included the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 59 the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms of 1950,60 the Refugee Convention of 1951, the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 6 1 the U.N. "International Bill of Rights" of
1966,62 and the U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman,
53. Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, supra note 10, at 188-89; see also United States v. Noriega,
746 F. Supp. 1506, 1533 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("As a general principle of international law, individuals have
no standing to challenge violations of international treaties in the absence of protest by the sovereign
involved.").
54. Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, supra note 10, at 189.
55. For example, U.S. and Canadian courts have indicated that they will not follow the rule of
non-inquiry when the likely treatment in the requesting state is "antipathetic to a federal court's sense of
decency," Gallina v Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960), "shocks the conscience," Canada v.
Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, 522 (Can.), or is "simply unacceptable," United States v Allard, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 564, 572 (Can.).
56. For a brief history of the birth of the modem human rights movement, see CAROL DEVINE,
CAROL RAE HANSEN & RALPH WILDE, HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ESSENTIAL REFERENCE 119-21 (1999).
57. FOONER, supra note 44, at 145.
58. ARVINDER SAMBEI & JOHN R.W.D. JONES, EXTRADITION LAW HANDBOOK 95 (2005).
59. The "grave breaches" provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 create a mandatory
"try-or-extradite" regime for specified serious violations of the provisions of the conventions. Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field arts. 49-50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
60. The European Convention affords significant protections for persons subject to
extradition. For a detailed discussion of this role of the Convention, see GILBERT, supra note 47, at 79-
90.
61. The 1951 Refugee Convention, as amended by the 1967 Protocol, provides protection to
any person "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and
is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country . ."
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. I(A)(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. This
convention naturally has implications for extradition law. SAMBEI & JONES, supra note 58, at 97-98.
62. Along with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two United Nations
covenants-the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESC)-are sometimes referred to as the "International Bill of Rights." SAMBEI & JONES, supra note
58, at 97. "The ICCPR guarantees a large number of rights and freedoms including the right to life, the
right to be free from torture, the right to liberty and security of the person, freedom of expression, etc."
Id. China has signed the ICCPR. It has not ratified the treaty yet, but that does not detract from the fact
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or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984 (Convention Against
Torture).63
With these human rights accomplishments in place, the 1989 Soering
case 64 of the European Court of Human Rights marked a dramatic
"breakthrough" for the linking of extradition and human rights on the
international scene and served as a "catalyst of scholarly writings" in support
of this link.65 Jens Soering, a West German national, murdered his girlfriend's
parents in Virginia and then fled to the United Kingdom. The United States
requested his extradition, and the United Kingdom ordered his extradition in
response to the request.66 Soering petitioned the European Court of Human
Rights for relief under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights because, even though Article 3 does not include the death penalty per
se in its definition of "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,"
Soering would face "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" on death
row in Virginia.67 The Court agreed, holding that the United Kingdom was
required by Article 3 not to extradite Soering to the United States, in part
because there was a real risk that he would be subjected to inhuman or
degrading treatment by being kept on death row for a prolonged period.68 As a
result of this important holding, "the fact that the actual human rights
violation would take place outside the territory of the requested State did not
absolve it from responsibility for any foreseeable consequence of extradition
suffered outside its jurisdiction."
6 9
The Soering reasoning, while not universally accepted, 70 has gained
considerable influence worldwide. Much Western scholarly literature supports
its holding. 71 States have sought to renegotiate extradition treaties to take into
account more individual rights and to resolve some of the conflicts that arise
when a binding extradition treaty contradicts a binding human rights treaty.72
The United Nations Human Rights Committee accepted the Soering case's
reasoning in Ng v. Canada.73 Three premier nongovernmental international
that it is under an international legal obligation. See Sun Shiyan, The Understanding and Interpretation
of the ICCPR in the Context of China's Possible Ratification, 6 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 17 (2007).
63. G.A Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10,
1984), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
64. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
65. Roda Mushkat, "Fair Trial" As a Precondition to Rendition: An International Legal
Perspective I (Univ. of H.K. Ctr. for Comparative & Pub. Law, Occasional Paper No. 5, 2002),
available at http://www.hku.hk/ccpl/pub/occasionalpapers/paper5/paper5.doc.
66. Richard B. Lillich, The Soenng Case, 85 Am J. INT'L L. 128, 128-29 (1991).
67. Id. at 130-31.
68. Id at 130-45
69. Mushkat, supra note 65, at 1.
70. See Elizabeth Burleson, Juvenile Execution, Terrorist Extradition, and Supreme Court
Discretion to Consider International Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 68 ALB. L. REv. 909, 910 (2005).
71. See PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A NEW TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 489-710
(Albin Eser & Otto Lagodny eds., 1992); Lillich, supra note 66; John Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry
and the Impact of Human Rights on Extradition Law, 15 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 401 (1990);
Michael P. Shea, Expanding Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights in Extradition Cases After Soering, 17
YALE J. INT'L L. 85 (1992); Christine Van den Wyngaert, Applying the European Convention on Human
Rights to Extradition: Opening Pandora's Box?, 39 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 757 (1990)
72. Valerie Epps, The Development of the Conceptual Framework Supporting International
Extradition, 25 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. Rv. 369, 380 (2003).
73. Ng v. Canada, U.N. Human Rights Comm., No. 469/1991, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991, reprinted in 98 I.L.R. 479 (1993).
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law associations-the Institute of International Law, the International Law
Association, and the International Association of Penal Law-quickly
approved reports recommending that "both executive and judicial authorities
should refuse extradition whenever there is a real risk that the fugitive's
human rights will be violated in the requesting state." 74 As one commentator
writes: "[I]n the affairs of man, extradition has come full circle, from a
concern strictly between sovereigns in which the individual was merely a
pawn, to a concern of governments in which the individual is . . .often the
dominating force in particular cases ....
C. Which Human Rights?
The legacy of the Soering case is that a requested state should take
into account the human rights practices of the requesting state, as well as its
own obligations under international human rights law, when deciding whether
to extradite. Assuming that certain human rights may take priority over
bilateral extradition agreements and domestic extradition statutes, the question
remains: which human rights may be invoked? After all, while states are
interested in upholding human rights norms, extradition plays an important
role in crime suppression, so surely there must be some limits on which rights
can obstruct an extradition.
Some academic literature has sought to identify these limits. The
literature focuses on several rights that have been invoked to obstruct
extradition in the past, including freedom from torture; freedom from the
death penalty; freedom from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment; right to a fair trial; right to privacy; and freedom from
discrimination.
The overriding conclusion in the literature is that no rights violations
obstruct extradition per se, but many can obstruct extradition depending on
the parties involved and other circumstances.77 Torture, which is outlawed
under both customary international law and the Convention Against Torture,
comes closest to being an absolute obstacle to extradition, but even then the
"universally binding status of the norm may not exclude differences in
interpretation over what constitutes torture." 78 With respect to the death
penalty, certainly the fact that a fugitive will be executed if returned to the
requesting state cannot itself obstruct extradition, because international law
does not prohibit the death penalty. However, some states are so opposed to
the use of the death penalty that diplomatic assurances that execution will not
take place are necessary (and not even always sufficient) to facilitate
extradition. 79 Scholars have made arguments that a requesting state's lack of
74. Mushkat, supra note 65, at 2.
75. FOONER, supra note 44, at 145.
76. See, e.g., Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, supra note 10, at 195-206; Mushkat, supra note
65, at 2-3.
77. Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, supra note 10, at 206.
78. Id. at 198.
79. Id. at 196-97; Mary K. Martin, A One-Way Ticket Back to the United States: The Collision
of International Extradition Law and the Death Penalty, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 243, 253-57 (1999); Craig R.
Roecks, Extradition, Human Rights, and the Death Penalty: When Nations Must Refuse to Extradite a
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respect for various other human rights should absolutely obstruct extradition,
80
but the reality is that "there is no certainty about the content and scope of the
rights that are most likely to block extradition."' 1 There is not yet any
international law that conclusively overrides bilateral extradition agreements,
so whether or not any given human right will obstruct an extradition is solely
a matter of bilateral diplomatic negotiations.
III. DIVERGENT APPROACHES TO EXTRADITIONS WITH CHINA
Western nations have long struggled with how to pursue bilateral
extradition negotiations with the Chinese in light of their human rights record.
China is often described as harboring some of the worst human rights abuses
in the world. The U.S. Department of State laments the Chinese government's
,,82record as "poor" and "deteriorated. U.N. bodies are equally critical.83 There
have been eleven attempts to censure China before the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights in Geneva since 1990.84 Nongovernmental and watchdog
organizations regularly release scorching critiques. 85 While some claim that
these critiques are unfair and that China is being held to a higher standard than
other countries, 86 an objective observer must concede that China has yet to
halt its most significant human rights abuses.
Until the early 1990s, China had not entered into any extradition treaties
with other states. But around this time, as corrupt officials began to flee the
country in large numbers,87 the Chinese government focused on increasing its
international criminal cooperation. 88 In 1993, China signed its first extradition
Person Charged with a Capital Crime, 25 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 189, 191-97 (1994). Diplomatic
assurances are often unreliabie when they come from countries that routinely abuse human rights. There
has been much literature on the dangers associated with diplomatic assurances. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, "EMPTY PROMISES": DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES No SAFEGUARD AGAINST TORTURE (2004),
http://hrw.org/reports/2004/un0404/; see also infra notes 221-223 and accompanying text (detailing
dangers associated with relying on diplomatic assurances).
80. See, e.g., Mushkat, supra note 65, at 3-6 (arguing that the likelihood that the fugitive
would not receive a fair trial in the requesting state should obstruct extradition).
81. Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, supra note 10, at 205.
82. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 12.
83. See U.N. Special Rapporteur of the Comm'n on Human Rights, Implementation of the
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief Annex 1, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/51/542 (Oct. 23, 1996);
Philip P. Pan, U.N. Official Criticizes Education in China, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2003, at A20.
84. Each has failed, though. Chronology of Defeats of Anti-China Human Rights Attempts,
CHNA.ORG.CN, Apr. 16, 2004, http://www.china.org.cn/english/intemational/93203.htm.
85. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, REPORT 2005: CHINA (2005), http://web.amnesty.org/
report2005/chn-summary-eng ("There was progress towards reform in some areas, but this failed to have
a significant impact on serious and widespread human rights violations perpetrated across the country.");
Human Rights First, Human Rights Defenders in China, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
defenders/hrd_china/hrd chinahtm (last visited Nov. 7, 2007) ("The human rights situation in China
continues to be grave.").
86. E.g, Randall Peerenboom, Assessing Human Rights in China: Why the Double Standard?,
38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 71 (2005).
87. This exodus resulted from a combination of China's financial growth, which created
opportunities for corruption and a subsequent crackdown against corrupt practices. See Zhou, supra note
8.
88. Ding Zhitao, Fugitive Justice, BEIJING REv., Feb. 9, 2006, available at
http://www.bjreview.cn/EN/06-06-e/w-3.htm.
2008] United States's Response to Extradition Requests from China 189
treaty, with Thailand.8 9 Since 1993, it has ratified more than twenty bilateral
treaties, but they have mostly been with developing countries, including
Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Romania, and Russia.90 It has been
easier for China to negotiate with these countries, in part because they are all
formerly socialist countries, have legal systems similar to that of China,9 1 and
are generally less demanding about human rights issues. Indeed, although
China's extradition treaties with developing countries generally comply with
the principle of double criminality, the principle of specialty, and the principle
of non-extradition for political offenses, they do not provide other protections
for the individual. 92 These treaties have benefited China, as developing
countries in geographical proximity to China have attracted Chinese
fugitives-especially low-level officials who fled with relatively small sums
of money.93 From 1993 until 2005, more than 230 Chinese criminal suspects
were returned to China.
94
Despite obstacles posed by its human rights record, China has turned its
attention to negotiating extradition agreements with developed Western
countries. High-level officials wanted for large-scale, corruption-related
crimes have fled to developed Western countries at high rates,95 and China is
interested in prosecuting these fugitives. 96 Sustainable economic growth is a
primary focus of the Chinese government, 97 and corruption is a serious
hindrance to responsible growth. The official Xinhua News Agency quoted
sources from the Ministry of Public Security stating that "800 suspects at large
abroad [are] wanted for economic crimes. They are accused of embezzling a
total sum of almost 70 billion yuan (US$8.75 billion)." 98 An earlier
government tally estimated that at least four thousand suspected corrupt
officials had pocketed US$50 billion and were hiding from law enforcement.
99
The effort to bring corrupt officials to justice has reached the highest
levels of Chinese government. In 2000, China promulgated its first national
extradition law, "which provides for specific rules, conditions, and procedures
for extradition cooperation with other countries." ' 00 In January 2007,
89. Fu Hualing, supra note 5.
90. Id.
91. CHAU PAK-KWAN & STEPHEN LAM, RESEARCH STUDY ON THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
HONG KONG AND THE MAINLAND CONCERNING SURRENDER OF FUGITIVE OFFENDERS 1.7 (2001),
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yrOO-0I/english/library/erpO5 pdf.
92. Id 1.14. In China, the most controversial of these principles is the political offense
exception. The concept of "political offense" is often not included in the bilateral extradition treaties
signed between China and other countries. Qian Hu & Qiang Chen, China 's Extradition Law of 2000, I
CHINESE J. INT'L LAW 647, 649-50 (2002).
93. Ding Zhitao, supra note 88.
94. Sun Shangwu, supra note 13.
95. See Ding Zhitao, supra note 88 ("[M]ost Chinese officials flee to Western countries, not
vice versa.").
96. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
97. China Working Towards Sustainable Economic Growth, PEOPLE'S DAILY, May 9, 2002,
available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200205/09/eng20020509_95353.shtml; China's Wen
Pledges Fairer Growth, BBC NEWS, Mar. 5, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2lhi/asia-pacific/6418225.stm.
98. China Asks Canada to Extradite Former Banker, CHINA.ORG.CN, Jan. 27, 2007,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/news/l97945.htm.
99. Lague, supra note 9.
100. Huang Feng, The Establishment and Characteristics of China's Extradition System, 4
FRONTIERS L. CHINA 595, 595 (2006). In terms of procedure, China has codified the quasi-judicial,
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President Hu Jintao called for a "sustained fight against corruption" at the
Seventh Plenary Session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
held in Beijing. 10 1 According to Professor Wang Guixiu of the Communist
Party of China's Central Party School, "[t]he intensifying anti-corruption
punch reflects the fact that the top administration is coming to an awareness of
the crisis and has reached a consensus on combating corruption."' 1 2 Because
corruption enables "the well-connected to line their pockets at the expense of
the public," the people of China as well as the government are interested in
clamping down on it. 103 As one major component of this effort, the
government is aggressively seeking to cooperate in transnational criminal law
enforcement, especially with developed Western nations.
0 4
Western nations have taken divergent approaches in responding to
Chinese entreaties for formal cooperation. Spain and France have led the way
in reaching formal extradition agreements with China, under which they agree
to extradite wanted Chinese fugitives to China as long as Beijing makes
assurances that it will not execute them. Portugal and Australia also subscribe
to this approach. Meanwhile, Canada embodies a virtual non-engagement
approach with the Chinese on extradition; its system makes extraditions nearly
impossible to realize unless China improves its human rights practices. The
United States has chosen a case-by-case approach, earnestly evaluating
extradition requests from China and choosing to extradite only when certain
conditions are met. The remainder of this Part describes these three
approaches in turn, highlighting key differences between them and setting the
stage for an analysis of each approach's relative strengths and weaknesses.
A. Treaty-Based Approach to Extradition with China
There is no obligation undcr international law to surrender an alleged
criminal to a foreign state for prosecution. Nevertheless, many states desire
the right to demand the transfer of criminals from other countries, and
bilateral extradition treaties create this right. The "treaty-based approach" to
extradition with China imposes on both parties relatively inflexible
obligations to extradite, subject to whatever conditions are noted in the
treaty's text.
Between 1993, when China entered into its first extradition treaty, and
2005, when China and Spain signed their groundbreaking treaty, it seemed
unlikely that China would be able to reach an agreement with a Western
developed nation in the near future. "Negotiations with developed countries
quasi-executive approach. When requesting extradition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs preliminarily
examines the documents that China will provide to a foreign country. Then the Supreme People's Court
and authorized High Courts at the provincial level exercise their judicial powers to certify that the
requirements set forth by the Extradition Law and extradition treaties are met. But the ultimate power to
decide whether the person sought shall be prosecuted in China, and whether conditional extradition shall
be granted, is held by the State Council. Extradition Law, supra note 24, art. 29. The law also provides
procedures for making requests for extradition to foreign countries. Id. arts. 47-5 1.
101. Feng Jianhua, supra note 8.
102. Id.
103. Minxin Pei, The Tide of Cormption Threatening China's Prosperity, FIN. TIMES, Sept 27,
2006, at 13.
104. Zhou, supra note 8.
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were moving slowly," said Xu Hong, counselor in the Chinese Department of
Treaty and Law, in April 2006. 105 The reason such negotiations were
proceeding slowly was Western concerns over Chinese human rights
practices, and especially China's use of the death penalty. China is widely
reported to execute more individuals than the rest of the world combined'
and even uses the death penalty as punishment for nonviolent economic
crimes.
10 7
Such widespread use of execution is abhorrent to several Western
nations, but it is "a big problem particularly for the Europeans," according to
one commentator. 0 8 The European Union is "opposed to the death penalty in
all cases" and has consistently advocated for its universal eradication.t19 It
even makes abolition of the death penalty a requirement for nations seeking
EU membership.
10
Despite these views, European nations have successfully negotiated
extradition treaties in the past with nations that impose the death penalty. The
most prominent examples are negotiations that have taken place with the
United States. A majority of U.S. states and the U.S. federal system employ
capital punishment,"' and the United States faces severe criticism from
Europe because of this practice. 112 Yet, the United States and European
nations have found a viable middle ground to facilitate extraditions. The
United States has agreed to include assurance language in treaties with
European nations. Pursuant to such treaties, the United States, as the
requesting state, will promise the requested state that if the fugitive is
extradited it will conform to the requested state's desire that the death penalty
not be applied. 113 The European state will then extradite pursuant to this
assurance. Western European states now regularly demand that all of their
bilateral extradition treaties provide for such conditional extradition, and the
105. China Widens Net for Fugitive Fraudsters, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 29, 2006, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com cn/china/2006-04/29/content_580629.htm.
106. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
107. See Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, China and the World Day 2006: Innocence,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/actioncenter/actions/action7574.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
108. Lague, supra note I I (quoting Steve Vickers, president of the private investigation
company International Risk).
109. Delegation of the Eur. Comm'n to the U.S., EU Policy & Action on the Death Penalty,
http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/deathpenalty/deathpenhome.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
110. European Commission, The EU's Human Rights and Democratisation Policy: Abolition of
the Death Penalty, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/externalrelations/human rights/adp/index.htm (last visited
Nov. 7, 2007).
1. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Death Penalty Policy by State,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/firstpage.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
112. In 1990, the European Parliament called for a resolution on the abolition of the death
penalty in the United States See William A. Schabas, International Law and Abolition of the Death
Penalty: Recent Developments, 4 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 535, 558-59 (1998). Later, in December
1997, the European Parliament proposed another resolution, this one aimed at discouraging EU
businesses from investing in the United States in an effort to persuade American abolition of the death
penalty. Dorean Marguerite Koenig, A Death Penalty Primer: Reviewing International Human Rights
Development and the ABA Resolution for a Moratorium on Capital Punishment in Order to Inform
Debates in US State Legislatures, 4 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 513, 522 (1998). Europe continues to
protest U S. death penalty practices today. See Harold Hongju Koh & Thomas R. Pickering, American
Diplomacy and the Death Penalty, FOREIGN SERVICE J., Oct. 2003, at 19, 20-21.
113. Kyle M. Medley, Note, The Widening of the Atlantic: Extradition Practices Between the
United States and Europe, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1234 (2003).
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treaties forbid extradition "where the requesting state retains the death penalty
and is unwilling to provide assurances that this penalty will not be
implemented if the fugitive is extradited."
'1 14
The overwhelming size of China's human rights problems was one
major factor distinguishing Europe's negotiations with China from its
negotiations with the United States, however. The death penalty was only the
foremost of many human rights concerns that seemed to be impeding China's
ability to reach treaties with European nations.1 15 Of course, it was also easier
for the United States and Western European nations to reach extradition
agreements because the parties had established diplomatic ties, intertwined
histories, and cultural similarities that Europe does not have with China.
The common perception that China would not be able to enter an
extradition treaty with a Western nation was shattered when, on November 14,
2005, Spain and China signed a treaty for conditional extradition, making
Spain the first developed Western nation to sign an extradition treaty with
China. The treaty stipulated that extraditions from Spain to China would be
contingent upon China's promise not to execute returned fugitives,1 1 6 but the
treaty contains no other human rights protections. Chinese President Hu Jintao
and Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero signed the treaty in
Madrid as only one component of a comprehensive strategic partnership
between the two nations that would "usher in a new phase of development in
bilateral relations." 117 The extradition treaty was one of sixteen bilateral
agreements that the two leaders signed on the same day. Other agreements
included a trade accord, an agreement to cooperate on developing peaceful
nuclear energy, an investment treaty, and an agreement on the establishment
of cultural centers.1 8 Both sides expressed hope that their relationship 9would
serve as a model for strengthening the broader China-EU relationship.
The signing of the extradition treaty was not lost on public
commentators among the flurry of official government announcements, which
tended to focus on the economic and trade aspects of the deal. Chinese experts
confirmed that their government had legally committed itself not to execute
criminal suspects repatriated from Spain. The Chinese media described the
"non-extradition for death penalty" provision as a "major shift in tactics" for
bringing corrupt officials back to China to face prosecution, 120 and they
lauded it as indicative of China's respect for human rights. 121 Western
114. Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, supra note 10, at 192. For example, see Extradition Treaty,
U.S.-Fr., art. 7, Apr. 23, 1996, S. TREATY DOc. No. 105-13 (1996).
115. See Lague, supra note 11.
116. Article 3 of the China-Spain Treaty on Extradition states that an extradition request will be
rejected "[w]hen the offense for which extradition is sought is punishable by death under the laws in the
Requesting State, unless the Requesting State provides an assurance that the death penalty will not be
imposed or, if imposed, will not be carned out." Huang Feng, supra note 100, at 599. See also China-
Spain Extradition Treaty, supra note 14.
117. Press Release, Embassy of the P.R.C. in the U.S., China, Spain Establish Strategic
Partnership (Nov. 15, 2005), http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t221563.htm.
118. China and Spain Boost Trade Ties, supra note 18.
119. Press Release, Embassy of the P.R.C. in Austl., China, Spain Agree to Build
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (Nov. 16, 2005), http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t221674.htm.
120. China Widens Net for Fugitive Fraudsters, supra note 105; Sun Shangwu, supra note 13.
121. See Huang Feng, supra note 100, at 596; Sun Shangwu, supra note 13.
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observers acknowledged that agreeing not to use the death penalty was a
groundbreaking move by the Chinese, as they had never agreed to such a
provision before, 122 but they questioned nonetheless whether it was
appropriate to enter into an extradition agreement with such a frequent
violator of human rights. The Spanish branch of Amnesty International
severely criticized Spanish leaders for entering into the agreement in light of
China's human rights record. Protests followed in Madrid.
A little over a year later, in spite of human rights-based critiques of the
Spanish approach, the French government entered into a similar treaty with
China. President Hu and French President Jacques Chirac agreed on the treaty
in Paris in January 2007, and French Justice Minister Pascal Clement and
Chinese First Deputy Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo signed the treaty on
March 20, 2007.124 Like Spain, France insisted on terms that it will only
extradite upon receipt of a guarantee that the Chinese will not employ capital
punishment. 125 Both countries hailed the agreement as crucial for their
bilateral relations and the suppression of safe havens for criminal suspects.
26
Chirac also touted benefits for French business as a result of the French
government's engagement with Beijing.'
27
A variety of actors in France assailed the treaty. Amnesty International
France urged the French legislature not to ratify the text because of human
rights concerns.' 28 In response to the French Justice Ministry's dismissal of
the criticism, Amnesty France stated that there would be "no certainty that a
Chinese citizen extradited one day with the clearest guarantees will not be
122. While China had not previously entered an extradition treaty with a developed Western
country, other countries with which China signed treaties between 1993 and 2005 did ask for "non-
extradition for death penalty" clauses. Even some countries that continue to use the death penalty
domestically prefer to have such a clause in a bilateral extradition agreement. CHAU & LAM, supra note
91, 1.49. Huang Feng, Director of the Research Institute of International Criminal Law at Beijing
Normal University, has identified four ways that China previously avoided the direct expression of a
"non-extradition for death penalty" provision in extradition treaties:
1) ... [t1o persuade the other side not to include such a provision .... 2) to use more
general phrases in order to avoid direct expression .... 3) to set the issue aside in the
formal provisions of the treaty, but to make explanations in the minutes of the meetings
between the parties to the treaty .... and 4) to make a general stipulation in the formal
provisions of the treaty, as well as a supplementary explanation in the minutes of
meetings.
China used the first option in treaties with Thailand and Kazakhstan, the second option with
Russia, the third option with Belarus, and the fourth with Romania and Bulgaria. CHAU & LAM, supra
note 91, 1.50.
123. China and Spain Boost Trade Ties, supra note 18.
124. China, France Sign Agreement on Extradition, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 21, 2007,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-03/21/content_5874162.htm.
125. France Backs Extradition to China, BBC NEWS, Mar. 20, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6472679.stm.
126. According to the article, Chinese diplomatic sources believed that "[tihe treaty provides a
legal foundation for China-France cooperation in the fight against crime." French Justice Minister Pascal
Clement said the agreement was of great importance, "particularly for bilateral relations," and that the
agreement would "strengthen and deepen our judicial cooperation further." China, France Sign
Agreement on Extradition, supra note 124.
127. See Chirac Seeks China Business Ties, BBC NEWS, Oct. 25, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6083408.stm; France Backs Extradition to China, supra note
125.
128. France Signs Extradition Treaty with China, supra note 18 (referencing "continuing
reports of serious violations in China, including the use of the death penalty and abusive forms of
arbitrary detention, torture and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatments").
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sentenced to death at a later date on a different charge."' 29 Socialist French
presidential candidate S6gol~ne Royal joined human rights groups in
criticizing the extradition treaty with China. 130 Many critics focused on the
perception that France was motivated mostly by its economic bottom line in
agreeing to the treaty. In a joint statement, the Paris-based League of Human
Rights (LDH) and the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues
(FIDH) asserted: "the commercial interests of France do not justify the
slightest leniency towards China." 131 Jean-Pierre Dubois, president of the
French Human Rights League, proclaimed that he was "astonished that the
French government could agree to deliver anyone up to a legal system that
does not guarantee any individual liberty" and that "[i]t is clear that this treaty
has been drawn up for economic reasons, which is totally unacceptable."',
32
Portugal and Australia also recently signed extradition treaties with
China. Both treaties contain provisions that extradited individuals cannot face
the death penalty. These nations' motivations in entering into treaties with
China seem to mirror those of Spain and France. Portuguese Prime Minister
Jos6 S6crates, accompanied by a delegation of businessmen, signed the
extradition treaty at the same time he entered into a variety of other pacts with
China regarding "the economy, finance, culture and taxation."' 33 Australia and
China signed their treaty at an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
forum. The treaty, which has yet to be ratified by the Australian Parliament,
faces serious criticism from Australian human rights groups worried about
Chinese abuses and its inadequate legal system. 134
Yet such criticisms overlook potentially positive human rights effects of
such treaties. While there is no sign that the French, Spanish, Portuguese, and
Australians intended to do so, their cooperation on extradition with China-
coupled with the prospect of more such treaty negotiations-appears to have
contributed to a movement in China to eliminate the death penalty for
nonviolent crimes. The movement is largely based on the idea that abolition of
the death penalty for economic crimes like corruption could facilitate the
extradition of corrupt officials fleeing abroad.1
35
Chinese legal scholars are leading the movement. For example, Huang
Feng, director of the Research Institute of International Criminal Law at
Beijing Normal University, is outspoken in his belief that abolition of the
death penalty for nonviolent crimes "is pressing for China" precisely because
the Chinese need to sign bilateral extradition treaties with Western nations.
36
Wang Minggao of Hunan University agrees:
129. Id.
130. Martin Arnold, Royal Criticises French Extradition Treaty with China, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 9,
2007, at 5.
131. France Signs Extradition Treaty with China, supra note 18.
132. Kim Willsher, Don't Mention Human Rights, French Told, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
(London), Jan. 7, 2007, at 31.
133. Press Release, Portal do Governo, PM Wants to Showcase "A Modern Portugal" (Jan. 31,
2007), http://www.missaochina.gov.pt/noticias noticia_44.asp.
134. See Adams, supra note 18; Press Release, Philip Ruddock, supra note 17.
135. Lague, supra note 11; Liu Li, supra note 20; Zhang Zhiping, supra note 20.
136. Zhang Zhiping, supra note 20.
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Abolishing the death penalty for corruption will help to track down fugitive corrupt
officials. . . .Based on international practice ...criminals who face a possible death
sentence will not be repatriated. It has become an obstacle for China to chase and capture
fugitive corrupt officials. . . .[l]t is better to take more practical measures to bring the
fugitives back under China's own legal jurisdiction than to let them off under the shelter
of"no repatriation of criminals under a death sentence .. " Abolishing the death penalty
is helpful for punishing corrupt officials.'
37
Government officials also appear to be taking this debate seriously. At
the annual National People's Congress session in March 2006, some deputies
suggested that the death penalty should be gradually abolished for most
economic crimes, such as smuggling, theft, corruption, and bribery. The
proposal attracted "much attention and controversy." Various Chinese legal
scholars and commentators responded that the death penalty must be
maintained to deter individuals from committing crimes, including corruption,
in the future.' 39 Others maintain that the death penalty for nonviolent crimes is
justifiable because it educates the general public about behavior that is off-
limits 140 and because it has deep roots in traditional Chinese culture. 141
Meanwhile, U.S.-based scholars of Chinese law doubt that the abolition of the
death penalty for non-economic crimes would be enough for some countries
to extradite individuals to China. "It will increase the probability that other
countries will be willing to extradite suspects," said Donald Clarke, a China
law expert at George Washington University Law School. 142 "But [the
Chinese] will still have to overcome the obstacle, certain to be raised by
defense counsel, of significant torture in China in breach of the United
Nations Convention Against Torture."
' 143
B. Non-Engagement Approach to Extradition with China
In contrast to the treaty-based approach, the "non-engagement approach"
to extradition with China is characterized by an unwillingness to return
Chinese nationals requested for criminal prosecution. This unwillingness
might arise in the political or judicial branches of government. Its defining
characteristics are a lack of serious negotiations for an extradition treaty and,
additionally, the exceeding difficulty of returning a requested individual to
China on a case-by-case basis. This approach hinges on a Western nation's
serious commitment to upholding human rights and its grave distrust of
assurances from Beijing and overall disdain for China's record on human
rights.
137. Id.; see also China Hunts Corrupt Officials Who Abscond Overseas, PEOPLE'S DAILY,
Mar. 24, 2004, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200403/24/eng20040324-138361.shtml
(providing Wang's university affiliation).
138. Zhang Zhiping, supra note 20.
139. Id. (describing Chen Zhonglin's, Xie Wangyuan's, and Liu Tingji's stances against
abolition).
140. Jeremy T. Monthy, Comment, Internal Perspectives on Chinese Human Rights Reform:
The Death Penalty in the PRC, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 189, 208 (1998).
141. Lu Jianping & Guo Jian, Death Penalty in People's Republic of China: Quo Vadis?, 2006
ELECTRONIC REV. INT'L ASS'N PENAL L. A4, at 1-2, http://www.penal.org/pdf/ReAlDP2006/
DeathpenaltyChinaLU.pdf.
142. Lague, supra note 11.
143. Id.
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Canada is the most prominent nation to take such a non-engagement
approach to extradition with China. The totality of human rights abuses in
China, including torture, has made extraditions between China and Canada
problematic. While in 1994 Canada became the first Western nation to reach a
mutual legal assistance treaty with China, 144 further Sino-Canadian
cooperation in the areas of criminal justice and crime prevention in the form
of an extradition treaty appears unlikely in the near future. 1
45
Although a treaty appears unlikely, case-by-case extraditions without a
treaty are permissible under both states' laws, 14 6 and Canada has been willing
to engage China in ad hoc, case-by-case negotiations. "Disguised
extraditions," in the form of a negotiated agreement and deportation, can also
still take place in the absence of a treaty. 47 Individual negotiations potentially
would allow Canada, as the requested country, to demand substantive human
rights protections-such as protections against torture, interrogation, or
detention in inhumane conditions-beyond assurances that the requested
individual will not face execution. Yet when there are significant human rights
and other political differences between the two countries, it is exceedingly
difficult to achieve approval for individual extraditions from the judiciary and
the executive. Achieving approval for deportation is often no easier. Canada
has returned only a few criminal suspects to other countries absent a treaty,1
4 9
and Canada and China have had extreme difficulty in attempts to cooperate on
individual extraditions.
Canada has good reason to be cautious when considering extradition
with the Chinese. One criminal suspect that Canada did return to China was
Yang Fong, a thirty-five-year-old Chinese citizen. China wanted Yang on
charges stemming from a ten-year-old computer fraud case that involved
US$130,000. In January 2000, after a long negotiation, Canada received
promises that Yang would receive less than a ten-year sentence, and the
judiciary approved deportation based on this promise. Instead, Yang was
promptly executed without any explanation.1
50
144. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Can.-P.R.C., July 29, 1994, 33
CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 411 (1995). The mutual legal assistance treaty provides for cooperation in gathering
and exchanging information to enforce criminal laws.
145. See Comment, Canadian Court Doesn t Buy into Lai's Lies, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 9, 2004,
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-02/09/content_304375.htm; Maggie
Farley, Alleged Boss of China Smuggling Ring Presents Canada with a Conundrum Law, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 2000, at A6; Yang, supra note 21, at 4.
146. Extradition Act, 1999 S.C. ch. 18, § 10(l) (Can.) ("The Minister of Foreign Affairs may,
with the agreement of the Minister, enter into a specific agreement with a State or entity for the purpose
of giving effect to a request for extradition in a particular case."); Extradition Law, supra note 24, art.
15, ("Where there is no extradition treaty to go by, the Requesting State shall make a reciprocity
assurance.").
147. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
148. See York, supra note 22. Li Juqian, associate professor at the China University of Political
Science and Law, said that when there is no treaty, "'only diplomatic means can be counted on. If ties
between the two countries are not close enough, the procedure can drag out."' Ding Zhitao, supra note
88.
149. James Brooke, Canada's Haven: For Notorious Fugitives, Too?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29,
2000, at A 14.
150. See DOUGLAS STEWART, THE BRUTAL SEAS: ORGANIZED CRIME AT WORK 246-47 (2006);
Brooke, supra note 149; Farley, supra note 145. Except for the case of Yang, prior to 2007 China and
Canada had never reached an agreement to extradite a suspected economic criminal. See Will Gao Shan
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Even as it betrayed the Canadian government by executing Yang, China
was pursuing the arrest and extradition from Canada of Lai Changxing,
dubbed the "biggest tiger" of all corrupt Chinese fugitives and China's "public
enemy number one.'' 5 Chinese prosecutors claim that Lai, working from the
southeastern Chinese port city of Xiamen, was the leader of an operation to
smuggle shiploads of oil, rubber, cars, cigarettes, cellular telephones, and
other electronic equipment. Lai allegedly paid millions of dollars in bribes so
that Chinese navy boats would escort the ships carrying the illicit goods into
harbor. 152 In the summer of 1999, the Chinese government cracked down on
Lai's smuggling ring.'
53
Lai fled to Vancouver, Canada with his family in August 1999. Initially,
he was able to live luxuriously in Canada, and he filed an application for
political asylum. However, in November 1999, Lai was arrested by Canadian
officials for immigration violations. He has been in Canadian legal
proceedings ever since. In the meantime, the Chinese government has
obtained over eighty convictions, including fourteen death sentences, against
individuals who worked with Lai on the alleged scheme; so far, the
government has carried out eight of the executions. 154 Lai claims that he
would certainly face the death penalty like his colleagues if returned to
China. 155 As the New York Times outlined, the Lai case has created a
conundrum for Canada: "Deport him to China for trial on economic charges,
an almost certain guarantee that he would be executed? Or grant China's
most-wanted man asylum and unwillingly tell the world that Canada is a
sunny place for shady people, a haven for international suspects facing
excessive punishment at home?"'
156
Indeed, the Lai case has put Canada in a difficult position. Canada has
emerged over the last several decades as a world leader in human rights.
1 57
Upon receiving an extradition request, the Canadian executive branch
considers the rights of the requested individual, 158 and if the executive
approves an extradition, the Canadian Supreme Court will consider several
factors to determine whether it should intervene to protect individual rights.'
59
The Canadian public's strong support for upholding human rights plays a
prominent role in these considerations. 160 Yet, Canadian businesses have
Be the First Chinese Fugitive Extradited by Canada?, Chinese in Vancouver Blog, (Feb. 28, 2007),
http://chineseinvancouver.blogspot.com/2007/02/will-gao-shan-be-first-chinese.htm (referencing
statement of David Matas, lawyer of Lai Changxing, in a recent hearing).
151. STEWART, supra note 150; Brooke, supra note 149; Farley, supra note 145.
152. Farley, supra note 145.
153. Id.
154. Doug Struck, Canada's Extradition Laws Help Make Vancouver a Grifter's Haven,
WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2007, at AI5.
155. STEWART, supra note 150 ("Lai's fears that he will face the death penalty are justified.").
156. Brooke, supra note 149.
157. See Koren L. Bell, Note, From Laggard to Leader: Canadian Lessons on a Role for US.
States in Making and Implementing Human Rights Treaties, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L J. 255 (2002).
158. See Joanna Harrington, The Role for Human Rights Obligations in Canadian Extradition
Law, 43 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 45, 52 (2005).
159. See Paul Michell, Domestic Rights and International Responsibilities: Extradition Under
the Canadian Charter, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 141, 176-81 (1998).
160. Seventy-two percent of Canadians believe that promoting human rights in Asia should be
a priority for the Canadian government Paul Evans, Chairman of the Exec. Comm., Asia Pac. Found of
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much at stake in the Sino-Canadian relationship, and Canada's unwillingness
to extradite Lai and others to China damages trade and tourism revenue.
16 1
Moreover, "the political relationship between Canada and China is
[purportedly] on unusually shaky ground,"'' 62 and the Lai case threatens to
further undermine diplomatic relations.' 
63
Wary of the nation's growing reputation as a safe haven and the
consequences this reputation can have on economic and political relations, the
Canadian executive branch reached a deal with China to extradite Lai. 164
Immigration authorities have rejected all of Lai's attempts to gain refugee or
asylum status, 165 but the Canadian judiciary has characteristically emphasized
consciousness for individual rights. After numerous procedural delays,
China's Supreme People's Court sent diplomatic assurances to the Canadian
Federal Court that Lai would not be executed if returned (as the Canadian
government demanded). The Chinese claimed that making this promise was
"the only correct option to punish crimes and safeguard the interests of the
nation." 166 Based on this assurance, a Canadian official approved Lai's
removal order, but a federal court judge overturned this approval on April 5,
2007. The judge ruled that the official's opinion violated Canadian law
because it failed to determine if the assurances on torture were "meaningful
and reliable." According to the ruling, Canada must do more than just accept
another country's promise that it will not execute prisoners; it must prove the
reliability of the assurance. 67 Pursuant to the ruling, the Canadian Citizenship
and Immigration division is now undertaking the lengthy process of repeating
its review of the risks Lai faces in China.168 Lai's proceedings are likely to be
drawn out for several more years, illustrating the difficulty for China of
achieving an individual extradition with Canada.
Can., Human Rights and Canada-China Relations, Presentation to the Subcommittee on International
Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, House of
Commons 2 (Feb. 20, 2007), http://www.asiapacific.ca/analysis/pubs/speeches/
PaulEvans_.20feb07.pdf.
161. See Brooke, supra note 149; Satish G., Canada's Tourism Industry Continues to Suffer
Due to Diplomatic Rift with China, ETN ASIA, http://www.travelwirenews.com/cgi-
script/csArticles/articles/000094/009426-p.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2007); Struck, supra note 154
("Lai's continued presence has been uncomfortable for the Canadian government, which wants
improved trading relations with China.").
162. Evans, supra note 160, at 1.
163. Rod Mickleburgh, Risk of Torture Has Ottawa Reconsidering Move to Deport Chinese
Fugitive, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Sept. 19, 2007, at A10 ("Mr. Lai's status is an irritant at the highest
level of Canada-China relations ....").
164. Lague, supra note 9. Some have suggested that the Canadian government's desire to
extradite Lai is related to the goal of improving trade relations with China. See Struck, supra note 154.
165. Zhang Liuhao, Court Hears Last Appeal for Fugitive Lai, CHINA DAILY, May 31, 2006,
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-05/3 1/content_604460.htm.
166. China Pledges No Death to Get Back Fugitive Lai, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 14, 2007,
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-03/14/content_827211 .htm.
167. Sing v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration [2007] F.C. 361 (Can.). The opinion held
that an analysis of reliability of the assurance must encompass the question of whether it is "appropriate
to rely on diplomatic assurances at all from the Government of China." Id.
168. Fugitive Billionaire from China Tired After Ongoing Extradition Battle, CBC NEWS, Sept.
18, 2007, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2007/09/l 8/bc-lai.html.
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In addition to Lai, China reportedly is seeking the extradition of five
other individuals from Canada. 169 One of the five is Gao Shan, a branch
manager with the Bank of China in Harbin who allegedly embezzled one
billion yuan (US$130 million). The Canadian judiciary has been consistent in
its refusal to extradite these individuals. 17 Meanwhile, China's handling of
the case of Huseyin Celil-a Uighur imam of Chinese and Canadian
citizenship who was arrested in Uzbekistan, extradited to China against the
objections of the Canadian government, and sentenced to life in prison on
charges of terrorism-has angered Canada severely and increased tensions
between the two nations. 171 Canada's approach to Celil, Lai, Gao, and the
other fugitives has escalated criticisms that it is a premier safe haven for the
world's criminals.' 7 2 But Canada's actions have also elicited praise for their
leading protection of individual rights.'
73
C. Case-by-Case Approach to Extradition with China
In search of middle ground between a treaty-based approach with
binding terms and a non-engagement approach, a "case-by-case approach" to
extradition with China is characterized by unwillingness to negotiate for an
extradition treaty, at least in the near term, but by willingness to return
individuals to China on an ad hoc basis. By negotiating for individual
extraditions or disguised extraditions on a case-by-case basis, parties have
flexibility and can exercise more control over the terms of the extradition and
the assurances for treatment of the individual upon return.
The United States currently employs such a case-by-case approach. The
United States does not have an extradition treaty with China, 174 because
(while it cannot criticize the fact that China maintains the death penalty) it is
wary of China's use of the death penalty for nonviolent crimes and its lack of
procedural due process in death penalty cases.175 The United States is also
critical of China's poor human rights record in general and is concerned about
the overall differences in legal values between mainland China and the United
States. 176 As Jerome Cohen, a New York University law professor who
specializes in the Chinese legal system, points out, "There are important
169. York, supra note 22, at A22 ("The existence of [five] other criminal suspects on the list is
the latest development in a growing controversy over whether Canada is sheltering Chinese fugitives.").
170. Vivian Wai-yin Kwok, China May Cry 'Woe, Canada' in Embezzlement Case,
FORBES.COM, Feb. 22, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/facesinthenews/2007/02/22/canada-china-
embezzle-facecx-vk_0222autofacescan3.html.
171. Canadian in China Sentenced to Life in Prison: Report, CBC NEWS, Apr. 19, 2007,
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/toronto/story/2007/04/19/celil-sentence.html; Harper Warns China as Rights
Dispute Threatens to Expand, TAIPEI TIMES, Feb. 11, 2007, available at
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/02/11/2003348505.
172. Canada, Haven for China's Escaped Grafters, No Schedule for Extradition of Lai
Changxing, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Sept. 15, 2004, available at
http://english.people.com.cn/200409/15/eng20040915_157148.html; Doug Struck, Fugitive from Other
Places Go to Canada to Escape the Heat, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2005, at A14; Struck, supra note 154.
173. See Deborah Jones, Canada Deportation to China of Alleged Kingpin Stalled by Court,
AFP, Apr. 5, 2007, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-kmafp/is.200704/ai_n 18793594.
174. PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 26, at iii.
175. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 12.
176. Creekman, supra note 26, at 658; Rapoport, supra note 26, at 150.
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differences in principles and practices that make law-enforcement cooperation
between us and the Chinese difficult. I'm in favor of cooperation, but it has to
be consistent with our system and values."'
177
Ad hoc, case-by-case extraditions have the potential to attenuate some of
the problems associated with Sino-U.S. extradition attempts because the
countries would be able to negotiate new terms for each individual extradition.
The procedure for responding to extradition requests is for the foreign
embassy (in this case the Chinese Embassy in the United States) to make a
request to the Department of State, which reviews and forwards the request to
the Office of International Affairs in the Criminal Division of the Department
of Justice. This office assigns an Assistant U.S. Attorney to the case, and he or
she obtains a warrant to arrest the fugitive. The arrested fugitive is then
brought before a federal magistrate or district court judge for a hearing, during
which the judge will determine whether the fugitive is extraditable. 178 There is
only a very narrow avenue within U.S. law for formally extraditing an
individual to a requesting state absent a treaty. In 1996, the U.S. Congress
amended federal law to provide for extradition from the United States, even in
the absence of a treaty, of foreign nationals who have committed crimes of
violence against U.S. nationals outside the United States. 179 If the court finds
the fugitive to be extraditable to China under this law, it will enter an order of
extraditability and certify the record to the Secretary of State, who then must
decide whether to surrender the fugitive to the requesting government. The
Secretary of State may take human rights or any other considerations into
account in making this decision.' 
80
Because U.S. law limits extradition absent a treaty to this one narrow
circumstance, the United States usually refuses to extradite a suspect to
China. 181 Beyond this narrow window for formal extradition absent a treaty,
though, in some circumstances, U.S. immigration laws permit the removal of
individuals sought by other countries when extradition by treaty is not
available. 182 The U.S. government acknowledges that immigration laws can be
used to "rid [the] country of dangerous criminal aliens and fugitives from
foreign justice in certain circumstances where formal extradition is not
177. David S. Cloud, FBI Aims to Build Goodwill with Chinese by Cooperating on Cases,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2001, at A24.
178. U.S. DEP'TOF JUSTICE, supra note 27, § 9-15.700.
179. 18 U.S.C. § 3181(b) (2006); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 27, § 9-15.100
(containing information about the amendment).
180. Rapoport, supra note 26, at 164.
181. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES WORLDWIDE (2003), available at http://hrw.org/un/chr59/counter-terrorism-bck4.htm (stating
that the United States is holding as many as thirty Uighur nationals at Guanthnamo Bay, Cuba and has
refused all Chinese requests for extradition); Sect Leader's Arrest Warrant Rejected, BBC NEWS, July
30, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/407599.stm (describing U.S. dismissal of
China's request for the arrest and extradition of Li Hongzhi, the leader of the Falun Gong religious
movement).
182. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 27, § 9-15.610; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT ON
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION (2001), available at http://www.state.gov/documentsl
organization/6545.doc ("[N]on U.S.-nationals located in the United States and sought by other countries
might in some circumstances be removable from U.S. territory under our immigration laws.").
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available.''183 In response to Chinese requests, the United States has used
alternative methods to return criminal suspects to China when extradition was
not feasible)
84
The case of Qin Hong is one example of the United States returning a
Chinese national to China indirectly. Qin allegedly cheated Shanghai investors
out of hundreds of millions of dollars. Chinese authorities had supplied
documentary evidence demonstrating that Qin had entered the United States
years earlier using a false identity, which made him subject to arrest and
deportation under U.S. immigration laws. However, because Qin had been
carrying a Panamanian passport at the time of arrest, a U.S. immigration judge
removed him to Panama. Then, according to senior officials, the United States
informally urged Panama to send Qin back to China, which a Panamanian
court did.
185
The prominent case of Yu Zhendong represents another example of the
use of immigration law to return criminal suspects to China. Yu was the head
of a Bank of China branch in Guangdong province. He was accused of
embezzling US$485 million with several co-conspirators as part of a scheme
to "launder the stolen money through Hong Kong, Canada, and the United
States, among other countries, and then to immigrate to the United States from
China with their wives by obtaining a false identity and entering into a sham
marriage with a naturalized U.S. citizen."' 186 The United States charged Yu
with racketeering under U.S. law (after receiving significant evidence from
the Chinese), and he pleaded guilty in U.S. federal court in Las Vegas in
2004.187 After pleading guilty, Yu stipulated to a judicial order of removal
enabling the United States to return him to China, which gave assurances to
the United States that he would not be executed or tortured and that he would
not be sentenced to more than twelve years in prison. 88 Yu's co-conspirators
have not pleaded guilty, were indicted by a Las Vegas federal grand jury on
charges of racketeering, money laundering, and fraud, and are awaiting
trial. While cooperation in the return of criminal suspects to China does not
have the same benefits for U.S. trade interests as it would for businesses in
other nations because of the already enormous flow of goods and capital
between the two countries, 190 the extradition or deportation of criminal
suspects to China can generate goodwill for the U.S.-China relationship. The
183. NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL CRIME CONTROL STRATEGY 41-42 (1998),
available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/media/pdf/iccs.pdf.
184. McNabb Assocs., supra note 38 ("There have been a number of instances in which
individuals have been sent from China to the United States to face charges, or vice versa.").
185. Cloud, supra note 177.
186. Mark L Clifford & Petti Fong, The Bank of China's Black Hole, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 4,
2002, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_05/b3768065.htm; see also
Cloud, supra note 177.
187. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 30.
188. Press Release, Embassy of the U.S. in the P.R.C, Chinese National Sentenced on
Racketeering Charges Returned to China (April 20, 2004), http://www.usembassy-
china.org.cn/press/release/2004/042004yzd.html.
189. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 30.
190. See Thomas J. Chnstensen, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for E. Asian and Pac. Affairs, U.S -
China Relations, Statement Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia, the
Pacific, and the Global Environment (Mar. 27, 2007), http.//www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/
rm2007/82276.htm (discussing the growth and important of U.S.-China trade relations).
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Chinese saw the United States's willingness to return Yu to China in response
to his consent and their diplomatic assurances as "setting an example of sound
China-U.S. judicial cooperation."'191
IV. ANALYZING THE U.S. CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH CONTRA THE OTHER
APPROACHES
In contrast to Spain, France, Portugal, and Australia, it still is unlikely
that the United States will enter into an extradition treaty with China because
of U.S. reservations about the lack of due process provided by the criminal
justice system and the generally poor human rights record in China.192 Yet, as
the above Section described, the United States occupies a nebulous middle
ground between the treaty-based and the non-engagement approaches. It is too
concerned about human rights to enter into a treaty, but it is willing to
cooperate with China on an ad hoc basis so as not to be labeled a "safe haven"
for fugitives. This Part evaluates the U.S. approach vis-A-vis the two
extremes. 193 The first Section defines the interests that are important to the
United States when it considers extradition with China. The following three
Sections analyze whether the current U.S. approach is well-designed to realize
these interests.
A. Defining Interests in US. Extradition Policy
States take a variety of interests into account when formulating
extradition policy. While the general interest in controlling international crime
is near-universal, other interests are country-specific. For example, China's
primary interest in improving extradition practices is to clamp down on
corruption. 194 Meanwhile, the nations that have adopted the treaty-based
approach seem particularly interested in cooperating on international crime
suppression as a way to enhance business ties.' 95 As Canada forms its policy
for extradition with China, it is particularly interested in maintaining its
position as a preeminent protector of human rights.1
96
A threshold question for analyzing the effectiveness of the U.S.
approach, then, is: what interests are important to the United States as it forms
its policy for extradition with China? The United States has made clear that its
primary reason for increasing cooperation with other states in extradition is to
build goodwill in order to gain international judicial assistance in prosecuting
191. Smuggler Lai Can't Escape Law Punishment, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 4, 2006, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-03/04/content_526581 .htm.
192. Creekman, supra note 26, at 658; Rapoport, supra note 26, at 150.
193. It is important to note that an overall analysis of the different approaches is made more
difficult by the fact that there has been no complete empirical study of what has happened to the
individuals that have been returned to China.
194. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text; Lague, supra note 9; Press Release,
Embassy of the P.R.C. in the U.S., China Vows to Deepen Int'l Co-op in Fight Corruption [sic] (June
14, 2006), available at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t257928.htm.
195. See supra Section III.A; Willsher, supra note 132.
196. See supra Section III.B.
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the war on terror. 197 Indeed, extradition and other forms of judicial
cooperation can be important tools for bringing terrorists to justice and
maintaining social order.'
98
U.S. officials also purport to be very concerned with the rights of
individuals facing extradition proceedings. Indeed, the United States has
long subscribed to the idea that a requested state should make a determination
of whether a requesting state will protect the individual rights of a fugitive
before deciding whether to extradite. 200 However, the United States's overall
human rights record in the context of international crime cooperation has been
mixed. Alleged U.S. participation in extraordinary renditions,20 1 for example,
suggests a divide between U.S. rhetoric and practice in the protection of
individual rights. Still, taking the U.S. government at its word, it is interested
in protecting individual rights in extradition.
The ability of the United States (as the requested state) to consider the
domestic human rights practices of a requesting state like China coupled with
the ongoing debate in China about whether to abolish the death penalty for
nonviolent crimes gives rise to a third U.S. interest: the interest in pressuring
China to reform its human rights practices. Despite criticisms that it is
meddling 202 or being hypocritical, the United States has long been
interested in pressuring China to reform its human rights practices and has
pursued this strategy in a variety of ways.2 0 4 Insofar as the experience of
197. Medley, supra note 113, at 1215 ("The American government now prioritizes the
improvement of extradition practices in an effort to find the parties responsible for 9/11 and to prevent
future attacks.").
198. Christopher C. Joyner, International Extradition and Global Terrorism. Bringing
International Criminals to Justice, 25 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 493, 494-507 (2003).
199. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, The United States' Response to the Questions
Asked by the Committee Against Torture (May 8, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/
g/drl/rls/68562.htm.
200. See supra Section III.C. A broad review of a requesting state's domestic human rights
practices can serve as a sufficient proxy for the requested state to make a determination to extradite in an
individual case. Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, supra note 10, at 191.
201. An "extraordinary rendition" is an intelligence-gathering program involving the transfer of
foreign nationals suspected of involvement in terrorism to detention and interrogation to countnes,
typically in the Middle East, with records of using torture. Suspects are detained and interrogated either
by U.S. personnel at U.S.-run detention facilities or, alternatively, are handed over to the custody of
foreign agents for interrogation. LIONEL BEEHNER, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TORTURE, THE
UNITED STATES, AND LAWS OF WAR (Nov. 11, 2005), http://www.cfr.org/publication/
9209/torture the unitedstates andlawsofwar.html.
202. China often speaks out about meddling from Western nations concerned about human
rights. See Amy Hampton, Population Control in China Sacrificing Human Rights for the Greater
Good? Birth Control Surgeries: 1971-1986, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L 321, 343 (2003); Jeremy
Brooks Rosen, Note, China, Emerging Economies, and the World Trade Order, 46 DUKE L.J. 1519,
1534 n.105 (1997); U.S., Japan Meddling in China's Internal Affair, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Feb. 22, 2005,
available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200502/22/eng20050222_174238.html.
203. China also has long accused the United States of being hypocritical in criticizing human
nghts abuses in China while it violates human rights. See, e.g., Press Release, Consulate-General of the
P.R.C. in Houston, U.S. Is Hypocritical over Human Rights Jibes: Commentary, available at
http://houston.china-consulate.org/eng/zt/zmgx/t80750.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2007). China's
Information Office of the State Council annually publishes a report criticizing U.S. human rights abuses.
E.g., INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL, THE HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD OF THE UNITED STATES IN
2006, Mar. 8, 2007, available at http://www.gov.cn/misc/2007-03/08/content_545466.htm.
204. See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls? Problems and
Prospects of U.S -Sponsored 'Rule Of Law' Reform Projects in the People's Republic of China, 18
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Spain, France, Portugal, and Australia has demonstrated that extradition can
influence the human rights debate in China because the Chinese are so intent
on stamping out corruption, the United States will be interested in shaping its
extradition policy in a way that will increase, rather than alleviate, the
pressure on China to enact human rights reforms. The United States can
justify including a push for broad-based human rights reform through
extradition as one of its main interests, along with its interest in prosecuting
terrorism and its interest in protecting the rights of the requested individual.
These interests are not in tension with one another; the United States can
pursue all three through one coherent strategy.
B. The U.S. Approach and Cooperation in the Pursuit of Terrorists
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S.
government quickly sought to obtain the support and cooperation of foreign
states.20 5 While China may not be the most likely safe haven for terrorists that
the United States desires, the United States saw important benefits to enlisting
the full support of China in the counterterrorism effort post-September 11 th.
These benefits included support in United Nations Security Council
deliberations; 206 gaining information related to terrorism from Beijing20 7 and
ensuring that the Chinese government would refrain from protesting bombings
in Afghanistan; the assignment of U.S. forces to the area; and "discussions of
nation-building for postwar Afghanistan.' 20 8 Such actions would typically
invite significant criticism from China, 20 9 but the U.S. approach of deciding
whether to extradite or deport criminal suspects requested by China on an ad
hoc, case-by-case basis-backed up by a willingness to follow through with
returning suspects as demonstrated by the Yu Zhendong case-proved
sufficient to gain cooperation from the Chinese. The Sino-U.S. bilateralS210
relationship improved as a result of U.S. cooperation, and China set aside
traditional security considerations and supported the United States's call for a
global campaign against terrorism.
2 11
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 64, 69-72 (2000) (describing U.S. efforts to use most-favored nation status and
rule-of-law initiatives to pressure China to improve its human rights performance).
205. See, e.g., 'You Are Either with Us or Against Us', CNN.cOM, Nov. 6, 2001,
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/I 1/06/gen.attack.on.terror/.
206. See DAVID M. LAMPTON & RICHARD DANIEL EWING, THE NIXON CTR., THE U.S.-CHINA
RELATIONSHIP FACING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CRISES 32 (2003), available at
http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/USChinaRelations2003.pdf.
207. See, e.g., Barry Schweid, China Agrees to Give U.S. Information on Terrorists,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 22, 2001, at A7.
208. Elizabeth Economy & Adam Segal, U.S. and China Open a Door, NEWSDAY, Oct. 26,
2001, available at http://www.cfr.org/pubhcation/41 Il/us-and china.open.a_door.html.
209. Id.
210. See Press Release, Embassy of the P.R.C. in the U.S., China Supports U.S. Indictment
Against Corrupt Bank Managers (Feb. 9, 2006), http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t234558.htm
(quoting Gong Xiaobing, head of the Judicial Aid and Foreign Affairs Department of China's Justice
Ministry, who commented on "an important cooperation-operation between law enforcement
departments of the two countries").
211. SHIRLEY KAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, U.S.-CHINA
COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION: ISSUES FOR U.S. POLICY 1-2 (2005); Jing-dong Yuan, Ctr. for
Non-Proliferation Studies, The War on Terrorism: China's Opportunities and Dilemmas (Sept. 25,
2001), http://cns.miis.edu/research/wtc01/china.htm.
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Certainly, China's assistance in the global war on terror is not just a quid
pro quo for the United States's cooperation in returning corrupt officials to
China. For example, the Bush administration's controversial decision to add
the Muslim Uighur separatists to its official terrorist list at the urging of
Beijing was also an important concession to the Chinese that may have
contributed to their cooperation in the global war on terror.212 However, if the
U.S. government was as unwilling as the Canadians to return criminal
suspects, it is unlikely that the Chinese would have lent cooperation in
combating terrorism regardless of other concessions that the United States
made. They would find the U.S. approach to extradition with China too
inequitable. 213 The United States's ad hoc approach to returning criminal
suspects to China, which is relatively cooperative, proved sufficient to satisfy
the important interest of gaining cooperation in bringing suspected terrorists to
justice.
C. The U.S. Approach and the Protection of Individual Rights
Generally, the United States emphasizes the importance of protecting
human rights, and it is exemplary in extending rights and protections to its
own citizens. The United States joins the Western world in speaking out
against human rights abuses in extradition. 4 The U.S. interest in protecting
individual rights often conflicts with its interest in combating terrorism,
though, and when it does, there is a need to balance these rights. While this
Note will address some areas in which the contemporary approach to
extradition with China can better protect individual rights,2 15 overall the U.S.
case-by-case approach is well-designed to protect human rights.
Indeed, the most important benefit to the ad hoc, case-by-case approach
in terms of the protection of individual rights is that the ad hoc approach
provides the United States with flexibility. 216 As one commentator has
acknowledged, "the party with the stronger bargaining power"-which, in the
212. The Uighur separatists are based in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in the
People's Republic of China and are calling for an independent state of Eastern Turkestan. Beijing does
not recognize their independence. Many human rights officials and Western diplomats criticized the
Bush administration's decision to label Uighur groups as terrorists, claiming that the administration had
no evidence of terrorist activity by Uighur groups and adopted this label solely to pander to the Chinese
government. See Enk Eckholm, U.S. Labeling of Group in China as Terrorist Is Criticized, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 2002, at A6; Philip P. Pan, Separatist Group in China Added to Terrorist List, WASH. POST,
Aug. 27, 2002, at A9.
213. Indeed, in stark contrast to the rhetoric of "success" and "progress" in response to the U.S.
approach, the Chinese have accused Canada of acting as a "haven for China's escaped grafters,"
Canada, Haven for China's Escaped Grafters, No Schedule for Extradition of Lai Changxing, supra
note 172, and "a haven for some of the most wanted fugitives in the world," Struck, supra note 154.
214. Seesupra Section li.B.
215. See infra Section V.A.
216. The advantages of flexibility in extradition negotiations are apparent when considering the
analogous U.S. practice of threatening to sponsor an anti-China resolution at the U.N. Human Rights
Committee. In the past, China has won the United States's forbearance in exchange for acceding to
various demands. Official visits to China by high-level U S. dignitaries-as well as state visits to
Washington by Chinese officials-have also been held out as carrots. See Elizabeth Olson, U N. Human
Rights Panel Faults Russia and Others, but Not China, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2000, at A 12. Like the
case-by-case approach to extradition, these practices enable the United States to pursue different human
rights goals at different times and to choose whether to cooperate at one point without binding itself in
the future.
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case of U.S.-China negotiations, is likely the United States because of China's
desperation to clamp down on corruption-"prefers a flexible approach ....
The weaker party, on the other hand, tends to prefer a carefully written
agreement with its terms 'cast in stone' ... ,2 Without a treaty, the United
States is bound by its own legislation only, and a state that need only follow
its domestic legislation in deciding whether to extradite "has no international
obligation to assist a foreign state." 218 Following a case-by-case approach,
then, provides the United States with the advantage of being able to refuse to
return individuals more easily if the human rights situation on the ground in
China worsens, or if the United States does not trust a Chinese diplomatic
assurance enough to follow through on a conditional extradition. 2 19 It also
enables the United States to negotiate for different human rights assurances at
different times. Many human rights-including freedom from torture;
freedom from the death penalty; freedom from cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment; right to a fair trial; right to privacy; and freedom
from discrimination-can obstruct extradition depending on the circumstances
of the case.220 By pursuing a case-by-case approach, the United States has the
flexibility to seek greater protections if torture or a fair trial or another human
right seems to be particularly relevant to the requested individual.
This flexibility is particularly important when one considers the well-
documented historic unreliability of diplomatic assurances. Some
governments routinely deny that torture or other human rights abuses are
221practiced when they are in fact systematic. China is one of the states that
has often violated assurances in the past. As mentioned, Chinese authorities
executed Yang Fong after assuring Canada that they would not do 
so.222
Suspects extradited to China from East Asian and Southeast Asian countries
without the assistance of treaties have been sentenced to death despite
diplomatic assurances that they would not be charged with the death
penalty. 223 At this point, there is no way to know whether China will uphold
its assurances. Because the United States has the ability in the case-by-case
approach to refuse to extradite in the future if China violates an assurance, it
creates an incentive for China to uphold its assurances.
The ability to cease extradition if China violates a human right is not
readily available to Spain, France, and Portugal now that they have ratified
treaties with China. When an extradition treaty is in force between two states,
217. Fu Hualing, supra note 5.
218. ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVE FOR ASIA AND THE PAC., MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE,
EXTRADITION, AND RECOVERY OF PROCEEDS OF CORRUPTION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 18 (2007).
219. As mentioned, the United States has been criticized for soliciting "diplomatic assurances"
of humane treatment in the context of extraordinary renditions from developing countries. Many human
rights organizations allege that these promises have been broken. See David Weissbrodt & Amy
Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Torture Convention, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 590, 611-25
(2006); see also supra note 201 and accompanying text Despite these critiques, no one has suggested
that the controversy over extraordinary renditions has influenced the willingness of the United States to
accept diplomatic assurances from China.
220. See supra Section II.C.
221. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 79.
222. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
223 Fu Hualing, supra note 5.
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the provisions of the treaty are followed as a matter of international law.
2 24
Moreover, even when states have included a provision in the treaty allowing
one party to obstruct an extradition, the states tend to interpret extradition
laws and treaties in favor of enforcement because this course is "perceived to
serve the interests both of justice and of friendly international relations."
225
While the existing extradition treaties between China and Western nations
provide for strong protections against capital punishment, they downplay the
importance of other human rights.226 Therefore, the treaty-based approach is
significantly inferior to the U.S. approach in its ability to protect human
rights.
Admittedly, based on the nefarious history of diplomatic assurances, the
U.S. approach to extradition with China takes more human rights risks than
the Canadian non-engagement approach simply because the United States
returns more criminal suspects to China than the Canadians do. While the
United States proceeds deliberately in negotiations with China, no state can be
certain that China will uphold its promises not to execute, torture, or violate
other human rights of the requested individual. Yet, China is far from unusual
in this regard; other countries, including developed ones, have historically
violated their word. More to the point, Canada's virtual refusal to return any
desired suspects to China despite substantial concessions on the part of the
Chinese is compromising Canada's ability to pursue other important state
interests, including broad-based human rights reform in China.221 With its
case-by-case approach, the United States is able to protect individual rights,
reciprocate enough to pursue other important state interests with the Chinese,
and, as the next Section will demonstrate, push for broad human rights
reforms.
D. The U.S. Approach and Human Rights Reform in China
Beyond protecting the rights of the individual extraditee, any approach
to extradition with China can consider pushing for broad, systemic human
rights reform. Because of China's determination to root out corruption by
eliminating safe havens abroad, creating extradition relationships with
Western nations may now be so important to the Chinese that they will
consider reforming some policies and practices that obstruct these
relationships because they violate international norms. This idea is new, and
nothing in the Spanish, French, Portuguese, or Australian discourse
surrounding the announcements of the treaties suggests that anyone foresaw
this possibility. But the recent debates in China about whether to eliminate the
death penalty for nonviolent crimes to realize more treaties with Western
nations suggests that this is a real possibility.228 Human rights scholar Errol
Mendes claims: "It is not beyond the imagination that the evil of corruption
224. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International
Law, Continued, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 444,474 (1990).
225. Dugard & Van den Wyngaert, supra note 10, at 189.
226. See supra Section III.A.
227. See infra Section V.B.
228. See supra notes 136-143 and accompanying text.
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and the global fight against it could be the ironic catalyst to completely bridge
the global divide between China and the West on human rights.
' 229
If extradition (along with other cooperative anticorruption initiatives)
really is to play a role in the effort of Western nations to push for human
rights reforms in China where other angles have failed,23 ° countries like the
United States must maximize their ability to pressure China, and a case-by-
case approach seems well-designed to do so. The reason the case-by-case
approach has potential to affect human rights reform is its flexibility. Spain,
France, Portugal, and Australia deserve credit for accelerating the debate
surrounding the death penalty. However, there is a need for a country that is
currently pursuing a case-by-case approach with China-and with which
China still desires a treaty-to add additional human rights issues to the
debate, such as increased mechanisms for realizing fair trials or improvement
of prison conditions. The United States is positioned to assume this role, and,
because China is seeking the return of individuals currently in the United
States, the United States has leverage to request these changes. Unlike the
nations that have adopted the treaty-based approach, the United States is not
locked into extraditing when the provisions in a treaty are met. Rather, it can
request conditions and assurances in each particular case while also working
on long-term reform in order to realize a bilateral treaty, thereby constantly
putting pressure on China to change its practices. Given that other nations
always have the ability to decline a request from Beijing to return a suspect
based on human rights (and sometimes nations do obstruct an extradition for
human rights reasons), the Chinese government might come to realize that
only long-term, systemic changes to its systems and processes will eliminate
these obstructions and clear the way for extradition treaties.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE U.S. APPROACH TO EXTRADITION WITH CHINA
As the above analysis demonstrates, there are real benefits to
maintaining the case-by-case approach. It provides flexibility so that the
United States can obtain different diplomatic assurances depending on the
human rights issues that an individual case implicates. To the contrary,
bilateral treaty commitments under international law create relatively
inflexible obligations. Further, the case-by-case approach enables the United
States to constantly pressure China to reform its practices that violate human
rights norms. The U.S. case-by-case approach also has proven to be
sufficiently cooperative to garner Chinese support of U.S. international crime
suppression efforts, including those invoked in the war on terror. The United
Nations best practice recommendations for extradition are that, when a lack of
trust about the "integrity" of another state's justice system inhibits the
realization of an extradition treaty, states should give effect to extradition
229. Errol P. Mendes, Introduction to BRIDGING THE GLOBAL DIVIDE ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A
CANADA-CHINA DIALOGUE 10 (Errol P. Mendes & Anik Lalonde-Roussy eds., 2003).
230. For example, in 1994 the United States abandoned linking China's overall human rights
situation to its most-favored nation status. VLADIMIR N. PREGELJ, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
REPORT FOR CONGRESS, MOST-FAVORED-NATION STATUS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 5
(2001), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl30225.pdf.
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requests on a discretionary, case-by-case basis.231 The United States fits into
this category in its approach toward extradition requests from China, and it
should maintain its case-by-case approach.232
However, there are three significant drawbacks to the U.S. approach as
currently fashioned: 1) while the approach is generally well-designed to
protect human rights, U.S. practices do not always match U.S. rhetoric in
carrying out these protections; 2) the United States can better guide China and
its public as to what reforms it needs to undertake to increase the number of
its extradition requests that the United States honors; and 3) the United States
can build trust better by cooperating with China on anticorruption measures
outside the extradition-human rights dialogue. This Part presents suggestions
for how the United States can improve its practices in response to extradition
requests from China without compromising the benefits inherent in a case-by-
case approach.
A. Enhance Protections for Individuals Through Domestic Legislation
The United States should increase protections for individuals in its
extradition proceedings so that it will have credibility in calling for more
human rights protections from the Chinese. Currently, there are few
protections for the requested individual in U.S. domestic legislation permitting
the formal extradition of foreign nationals who have committed crimes of
violence against U.S. nationals outside the United States, and there are even
fewer protections available to persons subject to "disguised extradition" to
China through immigration laws, aspects of U.S. law that are especially
striking when compared to Canada's extreme reluctance to return requested
individuals to countries (like China) with poor human rights records. To
comply with international and domestic individual rights norms, the U.S.
Congress (in legislation), the Secretary of Homeland Security (in immigration
regulations), and, to the extent possible, U.S. courts (in the course of
individual proceedings) should address the lack of protections for individuals
in formal extradition without a treaty and in "disguised extradition" through
deportation.
The ad hoc, case-by-case approach is the correct approach for pursuing
this goal. The case-by-case approach does not contain a detailed, binding
agreement between the requesting and requested state on what pieces of
evidence the requesting state must furnish to the requested state in order for
the requested state's judiciary to approve the formal extradition. Extradition
treaties typically include significant detail about what documents are
231. See U.N. OFFICE OF DRUGS AND CRIME, REPORT: INFORMAL EXPERT WORKING GROUP ON
EFFECTIVE EXTRADITION CASEWORK PRACTICE 7, 8 (2004), available at http://www.unodc.org/
pdf/ewgreport-extraditions2004.pdf.
232. This proposal for the United States to maintain the case-by-case approach is consistent
with a broader strategy of "constructive engagement" with China (as opposed to strategies that favor an
isolationist avoidance of political dialogue or strategies that advocate for more confrontational policies).
Mainstream U.S. policymakers have adopted such a strategy for engagement with China. See, e.g., Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of State, United States Urges China to Be Responsible World Citizen (Sept. 22,
2005), http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Sep/22-290478.html (containing former Deputy
Secretary of State Robert Zoellick's conception of a "responsible stakeholder" strategy for dealing with
China).
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necessary to approve an extradition. 233 Yet the U.S. domestic legislation that
permits extradition of foreign nationals who have committed crimes of
violence against U.S. nationals outside the United States on a case-by-case
basis includes no evidentiary requirements to protect the requested
234individual. When the U.S. Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 3181 and § 3184
to allow for the narrow avenue for extradition without a treaty, it could have
included language ensuring that the protections individuals are typically
afforded when there is a treaty would be available to individuals extradited
without a treaty, but it did not.
It is certainly possible to update legislation to enhance protection of
individual rights without significantly compromising other important state
interests. Some foreign jurisdictions have included significant protections in
legislation creating non-treaty schemes for extradition. 235 Congress should
include in domestic legislation parallel evidentiary requirements to those
typically provided in bilateral extradition treaties, including requiring
substantial evidence to prove the identity and location of the requested
individual, the facts of the case, the governing law in the requesting country,
the warrant for arrest, and all evidence necessary to justify committing the
individual for trial if the offense had been committed in the requested state. 6
The U.S. Congress also should amend domestic legislation to provide
the accused with some avenue to challenge his or her extradition, including on
humanitarian grounds. Even if Congress does not enact such legislation,
courts should take it upon themselves to provide such an avenue. Currently,
U.S. federal courts regard extradition as a prerogative of the executive, and
absent specific treaty provisions, "the courts have traditionally declined to
challenge the Executive by granting fugitives important procedural protections
that could delay, complicate, or even thwart the extradition process. ' 237 Courts
should not be permitted to allow extradition without providing the requested
individual's legal team an opportunity to view crucial evidence or diplomatic
assurances relied upon or even require an explanation from the government
for why it deems specific assurances sufficiently reliable.
A statute or a case law enabling the requested individual to challenge
evidence presented by the government, including diplomatic assurances,
would respect traditional due process norms and represent a significant
improvement in the protection of human rights. The law should require that
233. Treaties typically require requesting states to furnish documentation demonstrating the
identity and precise physical appearance of the requested individual, including fingerprints and
photographs if possible; probable location of the person sought; the facts of the offense and the
procedural history of the case; the text of the laws describing the essential elements of, and the
applicable punishment for, the offense; proof that neither prosecution nor the penalty are barred by lapse
of time; a copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by an authority; a copy of the charging document;
all evidence that would be sufficient to justify the committal for trial of the person if the offense had
been committed in the requested state, etc. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Arg., art. 8, June 10, 1997,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-18, 2159 U.N.T.S. 129.
234. 18 U.S.C. § 3190 (2006).
235. See, e.g., The Commonwealth, The London Scheme for Extradition Within the
Commonwealth (2002), http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Intemal/3806 l/documents/ (under
subheading "Schemes," click "London Scheme for Extradition Within the Commonwealth").
236. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
237. Rose, supra note 15, at 208.
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during the course of discovery the government furnish the evidence and
assurances that it relied on in deciding to grant the extradition request. Then
the court would permit the defendant to present evidence, including testimony,
to contradict the determination in order to respect due process. At least in the
context of extradition to China, a nation that has violated diplomatic
assurances in the past, an avenue for the requested individual to challenge the
government's evidence merits serious consideration.
Undoubtedly, this proposal for U.S. extradition policy with China is
controversial and will elicit critiques. Some will likely argue that enhancing
defendants' ability to thwart their own extraditions will compromise the
United States's ability to return requested criminal suspects and will thwart
the goal of suppressing international crime. However, the burden on the
individual to challenge diplomatic communications could be high. For
example, U.S. Representative Edward Markey (D-Mass.) introduced the
Torture Outsourcing Prevention Act to the U.S. House of Representatives in
2005 (a bill that died in the House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human
Rights and International Relations), which granted a requested individual
access to a U.S. court in order to challenge the extradition on the basis that
there are "substantial grounds" that the prisoner would face torture or
mistreatment, and explicitly provided that "diplomatic assurances" are
insufficient. 238 Creating a high burden would only halt extradition in cases
where the evidence used by the government was quite unreliable. It would
force Beijing to provide verifiable evidence and trustworthy assurances,
thereby enhancing the U.S. ability to achieve its goals through the case-by-
case method. With careful design, this proposal could restore a semblance of
due process to extradition proceedings without seriously impinging on
international crime control.
Another likely critique of this proposal is embodied by the political
question doctrine in U.S. constitutional law, a judicially created rule by which
courts decline jurisdiction, deferring to the political branches of
239 240government. Yet a recent federal case, Khouzam v. Hogan, suggests that
procedural due process claims of a requested individual are not nonjusticiable
political questions. The United States relied upon diplomatic assurances
against torture from the Egyptian government in support of their claim that
deportation was appropriate for Sameh Sami S. Khouzam, an Egyptian
national. Khouzam was never given an opportunity to see the assurances or to
challenge them on their reliability or sufficiency before an independent
body. 24 The government claimed that the decision of whether diplomatic
assurances are reliable is a nonjusticiable political question.242 However, in
Khouzam, U.S. District Court Judge Thomas Vanaskie held, inter alia, that
"[b]ecause the government has not provided Khouzam with an opportunity to
challenge the reliability of the diplomatic assurances and has not presented
238. H.R. 952, 109th Cong. § 3(d) (2005).
239. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-19 (1961).
240. Khouzam v. Hogan, 497 F. Supp. 2d 615 (M.D. Pa. 2007).
241. Id. at 624.
242. Id.
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any evidence to support its decision, the Court will not reject the due process
claims as barred by the political question doctrine."
243
While Khouzam took place in the immigration setting, its holding is
transferable to ad hoc extraditions. The logic in this holding supports courts or
Congress providing requested individuals the opportunity to challenge
evidence and diplomatic assurances that the government uses to support
extradition without violating the political question doctrine. Moreover, rights
protections should not be limited to those individuals in formal extradition
proceedings; the result for an individual deported through a "disguised
extradition" process is largely identical to that of an extradited individual, and
protecting the human rights of a deported individual in China is no less
valuable an endeavor.
In addition to providing more procedural due process to individuals
subject to extradition proceedings in U.S. federal court, the United States
might attempt to engage in more robust monitoring of the treatment of
returned individuals. As a condition to agreeing to an extradition request, the
requested state may require that its representatives be allowed to monitor any
diplomatic assurances that are given. To be effective, any monitoring
arrangement would have to include private meetings with detainees without
advance notice and medical examinations by independent doctors.244 China
should prefer a monitoring arrangement to a refusal to extradite. If it can be
achieved with China, monitoring-coupled with increased due process
protections for requested individuals-will go a long way toward ensuring
that U.S. practices match U.S. rhetoric in protecting individual rights.
B. Increase Public Guidance To Realize Desired Human Rights
Reforms
The goal for the United States and China alike is to reach a level of trust
so that diplomatic assurances and conditional extradition are no longer
controversial. In light of the intertwining of international extradition law with
international human rights law and the uncompromising U.S. concerns with
human rights abuses in China, the United States will only be able to trust
China when it enacts significant human rights reforms. While one cannot
know what type of guidance the United States is giving to Chinese authorities
in private, as the United States pressures China to curb human rights abuses, it
should provide clearer public guidance through its rhetoric for what reforms it
expects in order to facilitate the return of criminal suspects.
The government and individuals involved in high profile cases have the
ability to make statements putting pressure on the Chinese to reform their
practices. So far, the individual lawyers have made public statements about
what reforms are necessary to facilitate extraditions, while the government is
243. Id. at 625-26. In his memorandum opinion, Judge Vanaskie cited the importance of the
individual interests at stake and the fact that courts routinely "assess the adequacy of process provided
and the Executive branch's adherence to normative standards" in support of his ruling. Id. at 625.
244. These safeguards are necessary because human rights organizations have shown that
monitoring is not always effective to prevent torture. See AMNESTY INT'L, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH &
INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, REJECT RATHER THAN REGULATE 8-11 (2005), available at
http://hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/eul205/eul 205.pdf.
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being silent. For example, Lai Changxing's Canadian lawyer, David Matas,
said that Lai's case "will be read around the world and followed. If China
wants its fugitives back that are at risk of torture ... it has to stop torturing its
dissidents.
' 245
Public guidance should be an important part of any strategy to pressure
the Chinese government because this guidance can reach the Chinese public,
which recently has exhibited both the willingness and the ability to protest
government policies and push for reform.24 Corruption, as well as being
embarrassing to the government and damaging to state coffers, affects the
public. Indeed, the Chinese public has been outspoken in its disdain for
corrupt officials, blaming everything from soaring housing prices to low
pensions on corruption. Members of the public have gone so far as to state
that corruption "might jeopardize the Party or even the country." 247 In light of
its strong views about corruption, the Chinese people undoubtedly will be
interested in receiving information related to increasing the number of
fugitives returned to China and may very well pressure their government to
comply with reasonable requests. For its part, the Chinese government is more
likely to respond to large-scale pressure from within China than it is to be
affected by external pressure from abroad.248 In order to maximize public
pressure on the Chinese government to curb human rights abuses, the public
needs to have a clearer picture of which human rights issues precisely are
obstructing extradition. Therefore, the U.S. approach to extradition with China
should include pressure-placing rhetoric that is public, clearly includes what
reforms the Chinese must undertake to facilitate extraditions, and signals what
the results will be if they undertake these reforms.
C. Increase Cooperation Outside of the Extradition-Human Rights
Dialogue
Because the ultimate goal of the United States is to reach a point in its
relations with China where it can trust the Chinese enough that it can respond
favorably and unconditionally to its extradition requests, the United States
should nurture and enhance its relationship with the Chinese by cooperating
with them on what they really care about: eliminating corruption. After
President Clinton visited China in 1997, the United States and China
concluded a memorandum of understanding to establish a law enforcement
liaison group to combat narcotics trafficking, alien smuggling, counterfeiting,
249
and organized crime. In 2006, the United States cosponsored with China a
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major anticorruption and denial of safe haven conference to increase
international understanding and cooperation on these issues.250 The U.S.
government should continue to expand on these efforts to cooperate with
China in law enforcement matters. Finally, nongovernmental U.S. legal and
financial institutions should increase their own anticorruption cooperation
with their Chinese counterparts to improve knowledge of and responses to
incidents of international financial fraud; the U.S. government should
encourage and support such efforts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Human rights law is now inextricably tied to extradition law. Therefore,
if China is intent on realizing bilateral extradition treaties or other extradition
arrangements with Western nations, it will have to engage the West on human
rights and placate Western criticisms. Many Chinese are already realizing this
fact in their debates about capital punishment. But, by maintaining a case-by-
case approach to responding to extradition requests from China, the United
States signals that China's human rights record to date is not acceptable. The
United States does have its own interests to consider, of which cooperation on
international suppression of terrorism is paramount. Moreover, if it is going to
preach human rights in its rhetoric, the United States should improve its own
procedures for protecting requested individuals so as to avoid charges of
hypocrisy that complicate its ability to pursue reforms elsewhere. Thus, the
United States, in its extradition relationship with China, faces the challenge of
cooperating on one hand and of trying to protect individual rights on the other.
Realizing this challenge is to find a middle ground between the treaty and the
non-engagement extremes. However, in finding this middle ground, the
United States should also realize that extradition now presents an avenue for
curbing Chinese human rights policies that do not meet international
standards. It should engage the Chinese to capitalize on this opportunity.
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